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INTRODUCTION

During the last thirty years, tort law has experienced unprecedented change
in response to the challenges presented by the increasing complexity and
volume ofmass tort cases. What often begins as a trickle, soon swells to a river,
then to a flood of litigation surrounding defective products such as the Dalkon
Shield, Agent Orange, silicone breast implants, asbestos, and heart valves.
State and federal dockets become clogged with an insurmountable backlog of
mass tort cases. Repetitive litigation of the issues of causation, punitive
damages, and common defenses marks the initial phases of mass tort litigation.
To manage these challenges, bench and bar apply various aggregative methods
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to mass tort cases such as consolidation, summary jury trials, bifurcation,
litigation class action, multidistrict litigation, settlement class action, and
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' These methods have met with varying degrees of
success and acceptance. A method's success depends on the perceptions and
misperceptions of the jurists and counsel applying the methods. The two most
common aggregative methods, settlement class action and Chapter 11
bankruptcy, are mired in controversy and misperception, hindering the full
application of these techniques. A bias against settlement class action2 and in
favor of Chapter 11 resolution of mass tort claims has developed. This bias was
most clearly expressed in Judge Jerry Smith's dissents inAhearn1P andAhearn
I1, the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor,5 and
in numerous settlement class action decisions where certification of the
settlement class is narrowly construed.6 At the same time, some bankruptcy
statutes designed to protect claimants are commonly ignored, and the
Bankruptcy Code is loosely enforced in mass tort cases.7
Some perceive settlement class actions and Chapter 11 reorganizations to
be "functional equivalents."' They are not. While settlement class actions and
Chapter 11 are similar in many ways, there are differences which disadvantage
the mass tort claimant when thrust involuntarily into the bankruptcy forum.

Both proceedings are representational and aggregative. However, in a
1. Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, JudicialInnovation in Asbestos Mass Tort
Litigation,33 TORT & INS. L.J. 127, 145 (1997). Multidistrict litigation may be used only to
dispose ofpretrial matters and is not used to resolve fully mass tort claims. See Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 964 (1998) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 901130, at 4 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900 ("The proposed statute affects
only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation.")).
2. The bias may be more generalized, applying not only to settlement class actions
but to all class actions. See Appellate Courts ContinueOnslaughtAgainstClassAction, 19 CLASS
ACrIoN REP. 623 (1996).
3. Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Aheam 1"), 90 F.3d 963, 996 (5th Cir.
1996) (Smith, J., dissenting).
4. Flanagan v. Aheam (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Aheam II"), 134 F.3d 668, 674 (5th
Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting).
5. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (noting that Rule 23 certification requirements
are "designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or over broad class definitions, [and]
demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context"); see also Barboza v.
Ford Consumer Fin. Co., No. Civ. A. 94-12352-GAO, 1998 WL 148832, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan.
30, 1998) (noting that it is no longer necessary to consider "manageability" of a class, [b]ut that
does not mean that settlement classes are, as general matter, more readily certifiable than
litigation classes; indeed, the opposite may be true") (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 n.16).
7. See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mobey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 696
(4th Cir. 1989); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 64142 (2d Cir. 1988).
8. GeorgeneM. Vairo, Georgine, TheDalkon ShieldClaimants Trust, andthe Rhetoric
of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 79, 85 (1997); see also Ahearn 1I, 134
F.3d at 672 (Smith, J., dissenting) (criticizing class action proceedings as circumventing
Bankruptcy Code protections); Ahearn 1, 90 F.3d at 996 (Smith, J., dissenting) (criticizing lower
court approval of a settlement class action as avoiding Bankruptcy Code procedural safeguards).
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settlement class action, the class is represented by named plaintiffs and counsel
who undergo close court scrutiny before final certification is granted; in
bankruptcy, claimants are represented by members of creditors' and claimants'
committees and counsel for these committees. The committees are appointed
by the United States Trustee's office and are routinely approved by the court,
in some cases without a hearing.
A common misconception is that bankruptcy resolves all claims of a
debtor, including future claims. 9 However, there is a growing consensus in
decisional law that the definition of "claim" contained in the Bankruptcy Code
does not include future claims. Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code 0
attempts to remedy this defect. The trusts, channeling injunctions, and futures'
representatives created by § 524(g) are presently being challenged when trust
funds are found to be inadequate to pay all claims including future claims. A
recent challenge to the channeling injunction inln re NationalGypsum resulted
in a decision that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to discharge
9. The Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured,
or unsecured.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994).
Whether a future claim falls within the parameters of§ 101(5) has been the subject
of much debate and some decisional law. For purposes of this Article, "future claim" means
those claims that arise when debtors' prepetition conduct results in injury which manifests or
accrues after confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Decisional law on this issue has
crystallized around three alternative theories to determine whether a future claim or demand lies
within the definition in § 101 (5) and is dischargeable. These theories are the "accrued state law"
theory, the "conduct" theory, and the "prepetition relationship" theory. The "accrued state law"
theory holds that a claim is created for bankruptcy purposes when a claim accrues under state
law. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir.
1984). Under the "conduct" theory, a claim arises in bankruptcy at the time the conduct of the
debtor giving rise to the claim occurs. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 202 (4th Cir.
1988). The "prepetition relationship" theory requires "'some prepetition relationship, such as
contact, exposure, impact, orprivity, between the debtor's prepetition conduct and the claimant"'
to create a bankruptcy claim. Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper
Aircraft, Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Piper Aircraft, Corp., 162
B.R. 619, 627 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)).
These formulations of claims leave room for future claimants to slip through the
bankruptcy process unaffected. For example, future claimants who may presently be exposed to
an injurious product, but have not manifested injury, would not have a claim in bankruptcy under
the "accrued state law" theory. Parties lacking prepetition exposure or contact with the
offending product who are injured after bankruptcy confirmation are not entitled to bankruptcy
compensation through thebankruptcy claims process under the "prepetition relationship" theory.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
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future claims." If bankruptcy resolves all claims in a particular bankruptcy, it
is due to the strength of the trust that is established, not the strength of the
Chapter 11 structure. A trust established through a non-opt-out settlement class
action would bear the same result. Where the bankruptcy trust fails, future
claimants may receive 100% of their claims through successor suits, while
claimants with similar injuries would have received only a pro rata share
through bankruptcy.
The Chapter 11 structure results in delay and excessive transaction costs.
Debtors view the bankruptcy court's "related to"jurisdiction 2 and its power to
bring all cases, including state court actions, into bankruptcy 3 as an
opportunity to resolve all claims in one forum. However, tort claimants find
these Bankruptcy Code provisions create delay and cut off third-party sources
of compensation. Routine extensions of exclusive periods 4 by bankruptcy
courts create a status quo which discourages progress toward settlement and
causes further delay. The absolute priority rule, designed to protect bankruptcy
claimants, is not enforced effectively by bankruptcy courts or by claimants'
counsel. Bankruptcy estimation of claims'- creates a cap on the amount
available to pay tort claimants. The interminable delays and excessive costs
become coercive devices, placing tort victims at a disadvantage in the
bankruptcy process. Protections built into the Bankruptcy Code, such as the
absolute priority rule, must be strictly enforced for bankruptcy to work as a
solution to mass tort claimants. The delay engendered by the extension of the
court's jurisdiction over third parties and the repeated extensions of the
exclusive period must be eliminated. Bankruptcy should be a last resort to be
used only when a settlement class action fails.
Settlement class actions have many of the same elements and protections
11 without the delay and excessive transaction costs associated with
Chapter
of
the bankruptcy litigation process. Settlement class actions result in a defined
outcome resolved in a timely manner. The settlement and the settlement
process are subject to extensive court scrutiny. Under the court's discretionary
power, it may require due diligence by the defendant company 6 and may rely
on expert testimony to determine the fairness of the distribution offered to
claimants under the settlement, 7 a process similar to the valuation undertaken

11. Order on file with authors.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)(2).
13. Id. § 157(a).

14. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
15. Id. § 502(c).
16. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(1) and (3) gives the courts discretion to
"determine the course of the proceedings" and to impose "conditions on the representative
parties or intervenors." See Vairo, supra note 8, at 160; see also JAY TIDMARSH, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER 1998, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES (1998)

(reporting on the application ofRule 23(d)(1) and (3)discretionary powers infive representative
cases).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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in bankruptcy. The court may appoint fiduciaries to represent the interests of
future claimants"8 and may require that a large general class be divided into
subclasses with separate counsel appointed for each. 9
Settlement class actions have been criticized as collusive proceedings in
which claimants' rights are sold out by attorneys seeking to insure their own
fees.20 However, when a district court properly exercises its discretionary
powers it may insure that abuses-abuses that may be present in any process,
particularly those for which settlement class action is criticized--do not occur.
The misconceptions and biases of the bench and bar concerning settlement
class action and Chapter 11 bankruptcy bear reconsideration. Both proceedings
have a place in the resolution of mass tort claims. Preferring Chapter 11 over
settlement class actions this early in the evolution of each method threatens to
limit the proper application of both.
This Article compares the use of settlement class actions with Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganizations in the resolution of mass tort claims. Parts II and
III discuss elements that settlement class action and bankruptcy law have in
common. Part IV compares the perception and the application of these two
aggregative techniques to the global resolution of mass tort claims. Part V
discusses conclusions and recommendations for improvement of each. This
Article does not attempt to resolve all issues surrounding treatment of mass tort
claims in settlement class action and Chapter 11 bankruptcies but attempts to
spot issues which merit further discussion.
II. CLASS ACTION
A. Litigation ClassAction 2'

Group litigation is not a new concept. References to group litigation may
be found as early as the year 1199 when Martin, a rector, sued the parishioners
of Nuthampstead in an ecclesiastical court.' Mediaeval period suits at law to

18. See infra Part ILB.2.
19. Rule 23(d)(1) and (3) grants general discretion to subclasses. Marisol v. Giuliani,
126 F.3d 372, 379 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Under Rule 23(c)(1), class certification may be altered or
amended at any time before a decision on the merits. Under Rule 23(c)(4), the district court may
(and in this case must) divide the class into subclasses. And finally, Rule 23(d) allows the district
court to make such orders as are necessary to assure the orderly administration of the
proceedings.").
20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma ofthe Mass Tort ClassAction,
95 COLUM.L. REv. 1343, 1349 (1995); Judith Resnik, LitigatingandSettling ClassActions: The
Prerequisitesof Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 835, 836 (1997).
21. The term "litigation class action" was developed to distinguish traditional class
action, which is litigation oriented, from "settlement class action." TIDMARSH, supranote 16, at
19.
22. Master Martin Rector of Barkway c. Parishioners of Nuthampstead, Diocese of
London, in 95 SELDENSOCIETY, SELECTCANTERBURY CASES C.1200-1301, at 8 (Norma Adams
& Charles Donahue Jr. eds. 1981).
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win money judgments by groups such as guilds, villages, and church
congregations gave way in the eighteenth century to equitable actions in

chancery court designed to provide a means for large groups of individual
litigants with common interests to enforce equitable rights.2 This equitable

group litigation was not aimed at resolving legal claims or winning money
damages.24
When group or "class" action law established itself in the American
colonies, it continued to reside in equity and was governed by the Equity
Rules.2' In 1938, Equity Rule 38 was incorporated into the Rules of Civil
Procedure and was expanded to include actions at law in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.26 The newly constituted rule provided class actions could be used
to seek monetary relief.27 The language of the rule, as stated in 1938, did not
prohibit mass tort application. However, the Advisory Committee's comment
that mass torts are "ordinarily not appropriate" 28 for class action litigation
created a perception that limited its use in mass tort cases.29 In 1966, after a
quarter century of experience with Rule 23, Congress enacted revisions to
remedy serious defects30 and make class actions more available, judicially
efficient, and binding.3' The effect of the revisions, especially the creation of
Rule 23(b)(3) to allow a common-question opt-out class, opened class actions

to mass tort application.
The first court of appeals that interpreted Rule 23 after the 1966
amendment suggested the rule "should be given a liberal rather than a
' Courts tended to rule in favor of maintaining
restrictive interpretation." 32
a class
33
action. The liberal interpretation given to the 1966 revisions of Rule 23

23. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TOTHEMODERN CLASS
ACTION 160-61 (1987).
24. Id.
25. Id. at218.
26.
PROCEDURE §

See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

1752, at 15 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing class actions under original Rule 23).

27. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. Some types of class action presently available under Rule
23 also provide primarily equitable relief. Seeld. 23(b)(1)-(2).
28. Id. 23, Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendment, reprinted in 12A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. at 290 (1998)
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Notes].

29. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1752.
30. See Irving A. Gordon, The Common Question ClassSuit Underthe FederalRules
and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REv. 518,520-23 (1947); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The
ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 695-714 (1940-41); Note,
FederalClassActions: A SuggestedRevision ofRule 23,46 COLUM. L. REv. 818,822-33 (1946).
31. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 28, app. at 290 (stating that Rule 23
"encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and

expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated").
32. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Escott v.
Barchris Constr. Co., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965)).
33. See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968) ("But if there is to
be an error made, let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action.").
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initially resulted in a number of new class action filings. As courts began to
perceive management problems with class action cases, denial of certification
increased and the number of new cases filed declined. In the first twenty years
after the 1966 Rule 23 revision, certification of class actions became
commonplace, while courts denied certification of mass tort litigation class
actions. This trend changed in the early 1980s as courts hesitantly began to
certify mass tort class actions.35 At that point "certifying a litigation class in a
mass tort [was], at least in the right circumstances, no longer unimaginable."36
Some types of class actions, such as securities class actions, have become
routine.37 If no longer unimaginable, class action certification is still
unpredictable due to the tendency of individual courts to interpret strictly Rule
23s requirements regarding commonality, typicality, and representation.38
Courts have begun to take a more narrow view of class certification, reacting
to a perceived increased risk to defendants from the sheer size of the potential
liability in mass tort class actions.39 The restrictive application of class
certification criteria has resulted in denials of certification and, in many cases,
decertification by higher courts.'
B. Settlement Class Action
As promulgated, Rule 23 reflects the "different situations in which a class
action was thought to be appropriate by the draftsmen of the new rule."'a4 The
draftsmen did not envision the impact of mass tort litigation on the American

34. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In reNorthern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1982).
35. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472-75 (5th Cir. 1986); School
Dist. v. Lake Asbestos (In re School Asbestos Litig.), 789 F.2d 996,1009 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he
trend has been for courts to be more receptive to the use of the class action in mass tort
litigation."); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718,728-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 21 n.32 (citing In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.)).
36. TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 21.
37. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis ofRule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges,71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 89-91 (1996).
38. TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 21.
39. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470, 476 (1978)
(recognizing that refusal to certify a class may induce plaintiffs to abandon their individual
claims while granting certification may increase defendants' potential damages liability and
litigation costs that they might decide to settle despite valid defenses); In reAmerican Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1089 (6th Cir. 1996) (requiring strict adherence to Rule 23); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "sheermagnitudeofthe risk
to which the class action" exposes defendants creates irreparable harm).
40. See, e.g., Namoff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (In re Dennis
Greenman Sec. Litig.), 829 F.2d 1539, 1545-46 (11 th Cir. 1987); In re Bendectin Prods. Liab.
Litig., 749 F.2d 300,307 (6th Cir. 1984); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In reNorthem Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1184 (8th Cir. 1982).
41. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1753, at 44.
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court system or the movement among modem jurists toward alternatives to
litigation. As envisioned by its drafters, Rule 23 is a tool for organizing group
42
litigation. The language of the rule itself is litigation oriented, reflecting the

42. Rule 23 provides:
PREREQUISITESTOACLASS ACTION. One or
(a)
more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if(l) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
CLASs ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action
(b)
may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
the prosecution ofseparate actionsby or
(1)
against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
inconsistent or varying
(A)
adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class
which would establish
incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
adjudicationswith respect to
(B)
individual members of the class
which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect
their interests; or
the party opposing the class has acted or
(2)
refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; or
the court finds that the questions of law or
(3)
fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The
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assumption of the drafters that litigation was the goal of class action.
The drafters of Rule 23 provided not only for litigation as the ultimate goal
of a certified class, but also for settlement by the class. 3 Responding to the
realities of modem litigation, practitioners specifically have classes certified for
approval of settlements reached prior to commencement of litigation. In
settlement class actions, the parties typically seek certification of the class
under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(3) while seeking approval of the settlement under
Rule 23(e).
The overt assumption in a settlement class action, in which the parties
come to court with an agreement in hand, is that the traditional issues of fault
and causation will not be litigated, because these issues have been settled prior
to entering the judicial proceeding." Surprisingly, this assumption is not very
different from the prevailing covert reality underlying traditional class actions.
It is no longer assumed that filing a class action complaint will result in trial.
As one commentator states, "[b]oth the practice of litigation and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are shaped today by an understanding that the act of
filing a lawsuit does not constitute a statement of intention to try a lawsuit. 45
In a traditional class action, filing a complaint usually marks the
commencement of settlement negotiations. This practice is encouraged by both

matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecutionor
defense ofseparateactions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigationconcerning the
controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigationofthe claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the
management of class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (emphasis added).
43. Id. 23(e).
44. The common use of the word "litigation" to describe the legal process is
unfortunate because it connotes an actual trial on the merits. Judy Resnik distinguishes between
"litigation" and "trial," recognizing that a series ofjudicial determinations take place prior to the
final resolution of the issues at trial. See Resnick, supra note 20, at 849-51. This system is
perhaps better referred to as the 'judicial process". This phrase encompasses settlement as well
as litigation and trial and does not relegate settlement to an adjunct position. Therefore
"settlement" may be seen as a separate form ofjudicial determination of issues.
45. Resnik, supra note 20, at 836. It is important that lawmakers recognize the
distinction between litigation and settlement. Litigants possess certain rights that can be
redressed by filing a lawsuit. These rights should not be abridged. If litigants or potential
litigants choose to negotiate away these rights in exchange for settlement, the law that prefers
resolution should provide a means to facilitate settlement such as the Supreme Court did in
MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367,369 (1996), in which the court held
that "a federal court may [not] withhold full faith and credit from a state court judgment
approving a class-action settlement simply because the settlement releases claims within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."
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the policy and the rules underlying the litigation process." Support for a policy

of settlement can be found in a recent Supreme Court decision that provides
that state courts lacking jurisdiction to try a lawsuit have jurisdiction to settle
a suit.4 7 Expanded jurisdiction to settle may be a precursor to a separate
jurisprudence for settlement as opposed to litigation.48
The number of cases adjudicated fully is a declining percentage of the
cases filed,49 although it is difficult to determine the impact of the rules and
policies encouraging settlement. In 1938, approximately twenty percent of the
federal civil caseload was adjudicated fully. In the 1990s that figure stands at
under five percent." "[T]he fact that a case is processed in the aggregate (by

class action, multi-district litigation, or other mechanism) does not appear to
vary these proportions. Be it two-party or multi-party litigation, trial remains
the odd form of disposition while adjudications other than trial remain

frequent." 51
If the thrust of Rule 23, as presently interpreted, is to provide a structure
within which litigation, not settlement, takes place, then Rule 23 should be
amended to facilitate certification of settlement class actions. Although the
Supreme Court decision inAmchem clarifies the authority for a settlement class
action within Rule 23,52 a rule change may be needed to guarantee full
acceptance of settlement class actions. 3 Amendment of Rule 23 to provide

46. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for, and the local rules
of many courts mandate, settlement conferences in advance of litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
For example, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York has local rules that provide
for a mandatory Rule 16 settlement conference. See E.D.N.Y. Div. BuS. R. 50.7. A local rule in
the District of Massachusetts requires judges to inquire about settlement possibilities at every
conference during the litigation process. See D. MASS. Cr. R. 16.4.
47. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369.
48. In the 105th Congress a proposal to eliminate state court class actions was
introduced. The authors oppose this proposed limitation on state jurisdiction over tort actions.
If enacted, the proposal would eliminate a valuable recourse for mass tort claimants. At present,
when federal courts experience delays in resolving their case loads, mass tort claimants can turn
to state courts. If the avenue of state court resolution was eliminated, the class action process
could experience excessive delay and become a less effective process.
49. Resnik, supra note 20, at 838-39.
50. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE

FEDERAL JUDICIARY DECEMBER 31, 1995, at 36, tbl. C-4 (Dec. 31, 1995) (reporting that only
3.2% of civil cases reached trial in 1995).
51. Resnik, supra note 20, at 839.
52. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-29 (1997).
53. Within the existing rule courts have the ability to certify and manage the
settlement class action. Judicial interpretation has resulted in some doubt of the use of the
existing rule. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.
("G.M. Truck"), 55 F.3d 768,778 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the district court's failure to inspect
fully the Rule 23 requirement in denying certification to the class). This doubt has not been
clarified by Amchem. For example, when G.M. Truck is shepardized, it is cited as "warning
negative treatment indicated" but with "no restrictions" and not overturned, as would be
expected after the decision in Amchem. If Rule 23 is not amended, this doubt may continue even
with the Supreme Court's approval of the settlement class action in Amchem. Express approval
by amendment will end the doubt.
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specifically for settlement class actions has been proposed. 4 An amendment
providing for settlement class actions would facilitate the policy supporting
settlement and would recognize the existing reality that settlement, not
litigation, is the prevailing norm for the resolution of legal disputes.
A recent Supreme Court decision provides encouragement for settlement
class actions. InAmchem the Court recognized the reality of modem litigation
and made room for settlement as the starting point of the judicial process."5 The
Court acknowledged the validity of settlement class actions under Rule
23(b)(3) although it decertified the class because the putative class failed both
the preponderance of common claims requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
and the
6
adequacy of class representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).
In Amchem the Supreme Court recognized the policy underlying Rule
23(b)(3), noting that the drafters had "in mind vindication of 'the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring
their opponents into court at all."'5 7 The policy underlying Rule 23(b)(3) is
victim oriented and is rooted in equity.5" The Rule 23(b)(3) drafters apparently
intended to level the playing field by allowing plaintiffs to aggregate similar
claims that are too small for individual suits. In the aggregate, the burden of
litigation is shared among many, achieving a balance between the defendants'
usually superior economic condition and the individual plaintiffs' relatively
small claims.
Some commentators express concern that, in the case of mass tort class
actions, the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction so that
certification of a class now has a coercive effect upon defendants.5 9 The same
concern, that the aggregation of small claims into large class actions creates an
ovei'whelming monetary risk and can coerce defendants to settle cases in which
they have valid defenses, is expressed in decisional law. 6' In reality, risk of an
adverse certification decision is borne equally by plaintiffs and defendants. In
54. Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) provides:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an
appeal from an order of a district court granting or
denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of
the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments 1996).
55. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600-01.
56. Id. at 622-69.
57. Id. at 617 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A PrefaratoryNote, 10 B.C. INDUS.& COM.
L. REV. 497,497 (1968-1969)).
58. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 611 F. Supp.
1396, 1402 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Zients v. La Morte, 459 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1972))
(finding that "until the fund created by the settlement is actually distributed, the court retains its
traditional equity powers").
59. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 20, at 1349-50.
60. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/7

12

Rice and Davis: The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Ac
1999]

MASS TORT CLAIMS

actions where individual claims are of little monetary value or in cases where
individual rights are being vindicated, such as in a civil rights class action,
denial of certification comes as a "death knell" to the individual claims of
potential class members."1
Because of the impact a certification decision has on a party, there must be
immediate review of the certification decision. However, interlocutory appeal
of certification decisions was difficult to obtain under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 62
Interlocutory appeals required the approval of the district courts, some of which
strictly construed the requirements for approval.63 Recognizing the danger
inherent in a certification decision and the difficulty of obtaining appellate
review, the Supreme Court adopted the recommendation that Rule 23 be
amended to provide for permissive appeal of a certification decision.64 The
amendment became effective December 31, 1998.65 This amendment,
permitting immediate appeal of a certification decision, should have a salutary
effect on the application of litigation class actions to mass tort claims.
The issue of coercion is minimized in settlement class actions because
certification takes place after settlement is achieved. The financial pressure of
aggregated claims and the risk of failure to get recourse for small claims are
diminished when settlement negotiations take place among parties of relatively
equal power without the immediate threat of a win or lose situation for any
party.
In addition to the aggregative strength afforded the plaintiffs in litigation
class actions, Rule 23 provides for certain due process safeguards. In order to
qualify as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, common questions must predominate over
individual questions, and resolution of claims through the class action must be
"superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
' The Rule 23(b)(3) drafters intended it to encompass cases
the controversy."66
"in which a class action would achieve economics of time, effort, and expense,
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."'67

61. Report ofthe JudicialConference Committee on Rules ofPracticeandProcedure,
September, 1997 ("Denial ofcertification can toll the death knell in actions that seek to vindicate
large numbers of individual claims. Alternatively, certification can exert enormous pressure to
settle.").
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
63. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 476-77; Gardner v. Westinghouse
Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-82 (1978); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294
(7th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Wallace Silversmiths, Inc., 566 F.2d 364, 365 (2d Cir. 1977).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments 1996).
65. Order for Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure,
Evidence, and Appellate Procedure, 118 S. Ct. Ct. R. 1 (1998).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Courts may consider other methods, including the
bankruptcy option, when certifying a settlement class action.
67. Advisory Committee Notes, supranote 28, app. at 290. See Part III ofthis Article
for a discussion of the bankruptcy alternative to settlement class action and the possible
"undesirable results" which may derive from bankruptcy in the form of delay, excess transaction
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Settlement class action satisfies these objectives.
Because class action was intended as a means of resolving many claims
through representatives acting on behalf of individual claimants, interpretations
of Rule 23 establish that the court must affirmatively review the actions of the
representatives of the class settlements. 8 Court scrutiny of the settlement for
fairness and examination of the process by which settlement is achieved
provides identifiable class members a high degree of due process protection.
Class actions permanently affect the rights of claimants who are absent or are
unaware of the pending action. Because the settlement of the class action could
involve collusion among the parties, the court's role in reviewing proposed
settlements is that of a "'fiduciary...
serv[ing] as a guardian of the rights of
69
members."'
class
absent
To support its fiduciary role, the court is given broad discretionary powers
to enter orders concerning the conduct of the class action. 0 The court may enter
orders "determining the course of the proceedings," 7' may order extensive
nationwide notice,72 and may impose "conditions on the representative parties
' Employing these discretionary
and intervenors."73
powers, district courts may
order a company to undertake complete due diligence to support its fairness
deliberations and may appoint experts, including special masters and guardians
ad litem, to assist in the process. 74 District courts increasingly use their
discretionary powers to fashion settlement class action processes that are
effective in protecting claimant's rights. In many ways these powers and
protections parallel those exercised by the bankruptcy courts.75

costs, and forfeiture of ownership in the debtor company.
68. See Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426,433 (2d Cir. 1983) ("There is no doubt that
the district court must make an independent evaluation of whether the named plaintiffs were
adequate representatives of the class .... A judge has an obligation to consider whether the
interests of the class are adequately represented.") (citing East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-06 (1977)).

69. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(quoting Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975)).
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
71. Id. 23(d)(1).
72. Id. 23(d)(2); See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing notice in a settlement class action).

73. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3).
74. See TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 11-13. Tidmarsh's study analyzed, among other
elements, the notice, due diligence, discovery, and appointment of fiduciaries to represent absent

and future class members. The five mass tort settlement class action cases studied were Anchen
Products. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ahearn I, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996); In re
FactorVIII or IX ConcentrateBlood ProductsLitigation ("FactorVIII or IX"), 174 F.R.D. 412
(N.D. I11.1996); Bowling v. Pfizer,Inc., 143 F.R.D. 138 (S.D. Ohio 1992); and In re Silicone Gel

BreastImplants ProductsLiabilityLitigation, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
75. See infra Part IV (comparing settlement class action with Chapter I1
bankruptcies).
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Class Action Courts May OrderExtensive Notice Programsin
Mass Tort Cases

Due process requirements are especially important in class action
proceedings due to the representative nature of the action.76 In Amchem the
Supreme Court determined that certain due process requirements are
heightened in a settlement class action. 7' Rule 23 provides for mandatory and
discretionary notice. When a class seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
mandatory notice of the choice to opt-out is required. In addition, Rule 23(e)
requires mandatory notice of a settlement. The extent of notice required by
each section of Rule 23 varies with the degree of due process required.
In addition to the mandatory notice, courts have wide discretion at any step
in the class action process to fashion notice to class members under Rule
23(d)(2). This discretionary notice provision is commonly used to provide
extensive, nationwide notice of settlement to all class members, including
substitution notice to unknown class members. 78
The notice procedure in Carloughv. Amchem Produts,Inc.79 is an example
of the type of notice that a court may fashion using its discretionary powers.
Carlough, like all settlement class actions, required notice of the
commencement of the action and of the proposed settlement.8" Notice materials
proposed by the settling parties were designed to inform prospective class
members simultaneously that the case had been commenced and that a
settlement proposal had been filed."1 Although the notices were combined, the
court pointed out that the substance of both rules must be satisfied. The
requirements regarding commencement are stricter than the requirements
regarding settlement and are arguably stricter than the Due Process clause
requirements."2 The Carloughcourt noted that the standard under Rule 23 (c)(2)
required "'the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified.' 8 3 The court went on

76. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974).
77. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
78. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1979) (holding that requiring
individual notice under Rule 23(d)(2) in a civil rights action does not violate the 11th
Amendment even though this notice is not required in all cases).
79. 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In order to avoid confusion, it is important to
note that after Carlough resigned as a class representative, Georgine was substituted, and the case
took on the name Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. This case has also been referred to as
Windsorin reference to one ofthe respondents in the Supreme Court. See TiDMARSH, supra note
16, at I n.2.
80. Carlough, 158 F.R.D. at 324.
81. Id.; see also Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 830-33 (3d Cir.
1973) (holding notice of proposed settlement via one-eighth page columns in financial
newspaper insufficient).
82. See Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Burger &Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 90 (3d
Cir. 1985) ("A higher notice standard is established by Rule 23(c)(2).").
83. Carlough,158 F.R.D. at 325 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)).
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to state that "Rule 23 does not require the parties to exhaust every conceivable
method of identifying the individual class members."'
In approving the notice plan, the court found that the notice compared
favorably with notice approved in other settlement class actions. The
Carlough"5 notice program shares many common elements with programs
approved in other settlement class actions such as newspaper advertisement
notice, magazine advertisement, television, radio (unpaid), notification to labor
unions or other special interest organizations, notification to registries and
physicians, establishment of a toll free information number, and establishment
of an internet site. 6

The court in Carlough also compared its notice plan to the plan approved
in the bankruptcy proceedings inln reJohns-Manville Corp.8 7The court noted
that in the Johns-Manvillebankruptcy proceedings, no effort was made to give
future claimants individual notice, yet the campaign was determined to be
adequate."
A comparison can be drawn between settlement class action notice and the
notice provided in bankruptcy. How to notify all present and future mass tort
victims in both proceedings is uncertain, because the form of the notice is very
much a matter of the courts' discretion and not statutorily mandated. In
84. Id. (citing Bums v. Elrod, 757 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Hilt v.
Nissan Motor Co. (In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig.), 552-F.2d 1088, 1098 (5th Cir.
1977).
85. Carlough, 158 F.R.D. at 326-27. For example, the court compared the notice with
that approved in Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Products
Liability Litigation), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993). "Agent Orange" was a class action that
involved all persons exposed to Agent Orange defoliant in Vietnam, regardless of whether they
manifested any physical injury related to that exposure. Id. at 1428-30. The individual notice
effort involved mailing notice to persons who had already filed law suits in federal court and
whose cases had been transferred to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, persons who
had intervened or sought to do so, class members who had not yet filed suit or sought to
intervene but were represented by counsel associated with plaintiffs management committee,
and all persons listed on the Veteran's Administration "Agent Orange Registry." In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Additional notice was sent
to state governments for referral to any state agencies that might provide the court with names
and addresses of class members. See id. at 730-3 1. Media announcements including a toll free
telephone number providing further information were also undertaken. Id. at 730. The notice
provided in "Agent Orange" contained the information required under Rule 23(c)(2). In a
23(b)(3) class action, notice must
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
the member from the class if the member so requests
by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusions; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if the member desires,
enter an appearance through counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
86. TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 5, 40, 55, 67-68, 84-85, 96.
87. 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
88. Carlough, 158 F.R.D. at 326.
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Amchem the Supreme Court questioned whether notice to future claimants was
ever possible,89 a concern that would apply equally to bankruptcy notice
programs and class action programs. The issue of notice to future claimants in
either proceeding remains open.
2. Representation of Future Claimants
In addition to a notice program, settlement class actions may provide for
a court-appointed fiduciary to represent the interests of unknown and future
claimants.9" The fiduciary may be a special master9' or a guardian ad litem.92
The use of a fiduciary for the benefit of absent class members is new to
settlement class actions but is finding increasing application.93 InAmchem the
settling parties requested appointment of a fiduciary in the form of a special
master to determine whether class counsel's clients had benefitted more by
making prior settlements outside the class action than they would have had they
been included in the class action.94 The special master was provided with class
counsel settlement history for each jurisdiction and asked to verify that the preAmchem settlements were substantially consistent with each firm's historical
settlements for the appropriate jurisdiction.95 The Amchem settlement for class
claimants sought to provide historical values for similarly situated claims based

89. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
90. The Johns-Manvillebankruptcy was the first case in which a representative for
the interest of the future claimants was appointed. "Future claimants were determined to be
parties in interest and entitled to representation in the Manville reorganization. .. ." Manville
Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 66 B.R. 517, 520-21 n.1
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 744-45 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984)). Using its "all writs" power, the Manville court appointed a representative of
the future claimants to protect their interests in the bankruptcy proceedings. In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 36 B.R. at 757, aft'd, Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
52 B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). This device was repeated in the A.H. Robins bankruptcy.
See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 198 (4th Cir. 1988); see also RICHARD B. SOBOL,
BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 110 (1991) ("In the asbestos
bankruptcies, the courts had ruled that future claimants were 'parties in interest' entitled to
representation .. "). The legal representative for the future tort claimants in the A.H. Robins
case acted as a party with standing and was permitted to take part directly in litigation on behalf
of future claimants. Grady, 839 F.2d 198.
91. See TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing the special master appointed in
the Carlough/Georgineclass action).
92. See, e.g., Ahearn 1, 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996).
93. This fiduciary mirrors the future claimants' representative found in a Chapter 11
asbestos bankruptcy mandated by the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)
(1994). These representatives are not confined to asbestos bankruptcies and are replicated in
other product-related bankruptcies such as the Dalkon Shield case. See In re A.H. Robins Co.,
88 B.R. 742,744 (E.D. Va. 1988).
94. See TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 55.
95. Id. Special Master Burbank found that there were some disparities between the
prior settlement amounts and the Amchem settlement amounts. These disparities were small and
on occasion were unfavorable to class counsels' clients. See id. n.123.
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on years of experience and data in a litigation-driven process.96 The special
master confirmed that the settlements that class counsel had entered were
consistent with the historical settlements. 97 Future claimants were not
represented by a fiduciary during the settlement negotiation process. In the
Ahearn class action, the judge appointed the guardian ad litem to insure that
there would be no conflict between future claimants and claimants with
pending cases.9" The fiduciary in Factor VIII or 1X represented minors, not

future claimants." The appointment of a fiduciary in a settlement class action
is a flexible concept which may be shaped creatively to fit the facts of the case,
providing protections for existing as well as future claimants. Fiduciaries and
court officers provide independent, detailed valuation analysis to assist the
court's determination of the fairness of the settlement process.
3. The Determination of Fairness Is a Matter of Judicial
Analysis
The court scrutinizes the settlement procedure for fairness both in the
settlement and in the negotiation process leading to the settlement. After a
preliminary evaluation of fairness,0 0 the class is given notice of a fairness
hearing. Class members may object to the settlement or to the negotiation
process at the fairness hearing.' The court may use its Rule 23(d)
discretionary powers to appoint fiduciaries for future claimants. 0 2 At the time
of the preliminary approval, the court can express any concerns it has regarding
the settlement agreement, such as the need for subclassification of claims which
may lead the parties to reach further amendments to the settlement agreement.
At the hearing on fairness, the first principle that should animate the court's
approval of the settlement is that "the law encourages compromise to avoid the
uncertainties of the outcome of wasteful litigation and expense incident

96. Interview with Joe Rice, Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole (Mar. 1,
1999). Mr. Rice, one of the authors of this Article, was one ofthe class counsel and was directly
involved in the settlement process.
97. There is no requirement in bankruptcy to provide the claimant with historical
settlement values. While in some mass tort cases historical values have been used to determine
estimation for voting purposes, there is no use of such values, to our knowledge, for
determination of the plan payment or disbursement.
98. Ahearn I, 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996).
99. TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 11.
100. See, e.g., 2 HERBERTB.NIWBERG &ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcrioNs
§§ 11.24, 11-34 to -36 (3d ed. 1992). Preliminary court approval is usually sought of a joint
stipulation ofsettlement. The proposed settlement, accompanied by briefs ofthe proponents, sets
out the essential terms of the agreement. Where there has been substantial prior discovery, due
diligence, or otherjudicial or governmental proceedings prior to the settlement, the stipulation
may also be accompanied by an affidavit of counsel outlining this prior activity. Id.
101. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314,320 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
102. See supra Part II.B.2.
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thereto."'" s In mass torts, the claims and the related litigation are complex and,
consequently, expensive to litigate on an individual basis. Absent a class action
or other form of aggregation, the plaintiffs must present the same evidence to
multiple trial courts, while the defendants will repeatedly assert the same
defenses. Aggregation and settlement of class claims in a settlement class
action result in a savings of litigation costs, which can then be paid to
claimants.
The settlement class action not only negates the need for repetitious
litigation, but it also provides assurance that, through the court's scrutiny, the
claimants are treated fairly and equitably. The settlement-class-action court
goes beyond the passive, ministerial task of accepting a settlement as it is read
into the record. "[T]he district court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a
guardian of the rights of absent class members. The court cannot accept a
settlement that the proponents have not shown to be fair, reasonable, and
adequate."'" The court's close scrutiny while acting as a fiduciary for class
members is time intensive0 5 but should afford class members a high degree of
confidence in both the process and the due process protections." 6
The court bases its final approval of the settlement on testimony and other
evidence produced at the fairness hearing.' 7 The determination of fairness is
not a simple mathematical test,' and the court must analyze both the effect of
any proposed settlement and whether the settlement treats all claimants fairly.
For example, the court may ask the following:
[A]re the named plaintiffs the only class members who will
receive monetary relief? Is the relief proposed for class

103. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir. 1972).
104. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975)
(citations omitted).
105. See Willging et al., supra note 37, at 96 ("[T]he average class action demands
considerably more judge time than the average civil case.").
106. The fairness hearing in Georginelasted 18 days, and in Ahearn it lasted 10 days.
TIDMARSH, supra note 16, at 12.
107. The criteria for finding a settlement fair include:
(1) likelihood of recovery or likelihood of success;
(2) amount and nature of discovery or evidence; (3)
settlement terms and conditions; (4) recommendation
and experience of counsel; (5) future expense and
likely duration of litigation; (6) recommendation of
neutral parties, if any; (7) number of objectors and
nature of objections; and (8) the presence of good
faith and absence of collusion.
In reFord Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL-991,1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15867,
at *17 n.12 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1994) (citing NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 100, § 11.43); see
also Giusti-Bravo v. United States Veterans Admin., 853 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D.P.R. 1993)
(reviewing settlement proposal according to the criteria proposed by Newberg and Conte).
108. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION § 30.41, at 236 (2d ed. 1985) ("The
fairness of settlements cannot be measured by any simple mathematical yardstick.").
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representatives significantly greater than that proposed for
other class members? Is the total relief far less than that
sought in the complaint or indicated by the preliminary
discovery? Have major causes of actions or types of relief
sought in the complaint been omitted in the settlement?"0 9
In answering these questions, the court may rely on the parties to the
settlement and on independent experts and special masters. The court examines
both the settlement and the process leading to the settlement. This examination
is more critical in a 23(b)(1)(B) class action than in a 23(b)(3) class where the
claimants' right to opt out and to seek redress through the tort system acts as
a built-in check on the process. If the settlement is unfair, many claimants will
opt-out so that the settlement will fail."0
The appointment of valuation experts and officers of the court for valuation
purposes in the In re JointEastern & Southern DistrictAsbestos Litigation"'.
settlement class action is typical of how judges may use their discretionary
powers. In the summer of 1990, Eagle Picher Industries, Inc. sought
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of a mandatory, no-opt-out, nationwide
class of all asbestos related personal injury claims." 2 To determine the fairness
of the settlement and whether Eagle Picher met the (b)(1)(B) standard, Judge
Jack B. Weinstein ordered the appointment of a special master, the Honorable
Marvin E. Frankel." 3 Frankel provided a report that was critical of the
settlement and also testified concerning the settlement at the fairness hearing. "4
At the conclusion of the hearings on December 7 and 10, 1990, Judge
Weinstein directed Frankel to make another report on whether the settlement
proposal was more attractive than the bankruptcy alternative.' In the interim,
claimants' attorneys filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Eagle
Picher." 16 Eagle Picher then filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy prior to the

109. Id.
110. Participation is mandatory in the bankruptcy process with no right to opt-out.
Proponents of resolving mass torts via bankruptcy point to the bankruptcy claimants' right to
vote on the plan as superior to the rights afforded class action claimants. When observed closely,
the process appears to make the claimants' right to vote a hollow privilege. The representative
committees and attorneys largely determine the tort claimants' vote. In many cases, mass tort
claimants' votes are actually cast by their attorneys. There may be practical reasons for
organized voting by counsel in mass-claim cases, but there should be no illusion that tort
claimants in bankruptcy exercise more autonomy than settlement class action tort claimants.
11. White v. Eagle Picher Indus., Inc. (In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 134
F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
112. Id. at34.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 34-35.
115. Id. at35.
116. Id at 35.
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scheduled hearing on the special master's report." 7 In this example, the court's
use of its discretionary power to appoint a special master was effective in
preventing an unfair and inadequate settlement class from being confirmed.
4. DiscretionaryInjunctions in Class Actions ProvideSupport
to Settlement Agreements Similarto Bankruptcy Injunctions
To facilitate the federal courts' policy favoring settlement in multi-party
litigation,"' courts have increasingly approved settlement bar orders supporting
partial settlements" 9 and have exercised wide discretion in fashioning orders
20
to support the particular settlement and the policy of settlement.1 In multiparty actions where not all co-defendants enter into a settlement agreement, bar
orders are used to extinguish the rights of non-settling co-defendants.'
"Defendants, who are willing to settle, 'buy little peace through settlement
unless they are assured that they will be protected against co-defendants'
efforts to shift their losses through cross-claims for indemnity, contribution,
and other causes related to the underlying litigation.""' Bar orders in class
actions were originally used almost exclusively in securities class actions
because of the securities statutes regarding contribution among joint
tortfeasors.' Bar orders in securities settlement class actions are commonly
used to enjoin actions for indemnification and contribution. 24 The bar order in
a settlement class action is analogous to the channeling injunction in asbestos
bankruptcy cases and the discharge in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Bar orders in
support of settlement are especially important in multi-defendant class actions

117. Comparing the proposed class action settlement in Eagle Picherto the later
confirmed Chapter 11 plan ofreorganization is tempting. However, the authors question whether
a fair comparison can be made or any conclusions drawn after six years of "pot fattening"
bankruptcy litigation.
118. See Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910) ("Compromises of
disputed claims are favored by the courts...."); City ofDetroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,
459 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing settlement as "highly favored").
119. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478,486-87 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding
no abuse of discretion in district court's approval of settlement bar order).
120. See Franklin v. Kaypro Corp. (In re Kaypro Corp., Shareholder Litig.), 884 F.2d
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In essence, a bar order constitutes a final discharge of all
obligations of the settling defendants and bars any further litigation of claims made by
nonsettling defendants against settling defendants.").
121. See S. Arthur Spiegel, Settling ClassActions, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1565, 1573
(1994).
122. Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 486 (quoting Wald v. Wolfson (In re United States Oil
& Gas Litig.), 967 F.2d 489, 494 (11 th Cir. 1992)).
123. The Securities Act of 1934 does not provide an express right of action for
contribution among joint tortfeasors, but the majority of federal courts find an implied right of
contribution in Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 749 F. Supp. 1419,
1430 (D.S.C. 1990).
124. Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 483 (noting that the Supreme Court has implied a right
to contribution).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: 405

where defendants may, have divergent interests in areas such as liability,
tolerance of risk of trial, and availability of insurance coverage. Bar orders may
cause some joint defendants to accept settlement more readily than they
otherwise would."
Settlement class actions vindicate the underlying policy of tort law-to
compensate victims and to discourage bad actions by tortfeasors. In addition,
settlement class actions satisfy the public policy favoring settlement. The
compromises and trade-offs made in settlements are entered voluntarily by
class member representatives. The certification of the class is closely
scrutinized by the court on behalf of members of the class not present in the
negotiations.' 26 Areas of scrutiny include how closely the class
representatives
27
itself.'
settlement
the
of
fairness
the
and
class
the
represent
Settlement class action is relatively new in the evolution of mass tort
resolution, but it is a solution that, with further development and refinement,
can become a procedure for achieving favorable and voluntary resolutions of
mass tort claims. In a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, in which class membership is
involuntary, as it is in Chapter 11, a settlement class action offers the protection
of the court as it acts in a fiduciary manner and exercises broad discretionary
power to achieve fairness for tort claimants.
III. CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION

A.

Chapter11 Is a Recent Development

Contemporary bankruptcy laws trace their roots to medieval law. 2 ' The
word "bankrupt" originated in medieval Italy with the practice of expelling
insolvent merchants from the marketplace by breaking ("rota") their display
130
benches ("banca). 129 English merchants anglicized the term to "bankrupt.'
Contrary to common understanding, bankruptcy did not originate in equity.'3 '
Under English common law, bankruptcy was a criminal matter.'32 Authorities
were empowered to imprison a debtor until the debtor turned over his entire
estate for liquidation to pay claims.'33 English settlers brought the concept of

125. Id. at485.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
128. Bankruptcy, as the custom of forgiveness of debts, predates medieval law and
has its roots in the biblical practice of the jubilee year. Every seven years, the Hebrew people
were instructed to forgive all uncollected debt of other Israelites. Debts of foreigners, however,
were not forgiven. Deuteronomy 15:1-3.
129. See William W. Bassett, Exploring the Origins ofthe Western Legal Tradition,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1573, 1576; James E. Yacos, BROKEN BENCH REVIEW, 1991, at 8 (1971).
130. Yacos, supra note 129, at 8.
131. Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy CourtIs A Court Of Equity": What Does
That Mean? 50 S.C. L. REV. 276 (1999.)
132. Id. at II.B.2.
133. Id. at 285.
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bankruptcy to the New World and provided for enactment of laws governing
bankruptcy in the United States Constitution.'
The concept of bankruptcy-related reorganization is a relatively new
development in bankruptcy law. Statutory reorganization did not exist in the
federal bankruptcy law prior to the Chandler Act of 1936.135 Before the
Chandler Act, enterprising debtors evolved a form of corporate reorganization
known as equity receivership.136 Creditors used the equity receivership as a tool
to liquidate the debtor's assets. 37 Creditors traditionally initiated the process
by a "creditor's bill" followed by a sale of existing assets, with the proceeds to
be applied to the debts owed. 3 In the hands of enterprising debtors, it became
a form of reorganization. An agreeable, petitioning creditor "did not in fact
seek application of the debtor's assets to his claim" but instead sought a
receiver that would maintain the debtor's business as a going concern and
would provide a stream of payments. 39 Far from avoiding the "creditor's"
action, debtors often sought the preemptory filing of a bill by a friendly creditor
who might lose nearly as much as the debtor if another creditor filed a bill with
intentions to liquidate." Debtors would often cooperate with their bankers or
other major creditors for the purpose of accomplishing reorganization and
avoiding liquidation. 4' Anticipating the filing of the complaint, debtors would
often have a prepared response approved in advance by their boards of
directors.'42 "Because [the] purpose [of the filing] was reorganization, not
liquidation, the substance of the action was far removed from its traditional
uses, but its form remained the same."'43 The creditor's objective was to have
a healthy debtor with going concern value and a long term payment of debt
rather than to take a loss through piecemeal liquidation.
The Chandler Act of 1936 codified the equity receivership procedure as the
Chapter XI reorganization.'" The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197814 amended
and further refined statutory reorganization into the Chapter 11 of the
134. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the BankruptcyLaws in the United States,
3 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 5, 6-13 (1995). The bankruptcy provisions of the Constitution are
attributed to Charles Pinckney, one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and one
of the five signers of the Declaration of Independence from South Carolina.
135. Chandler Act of 1936, ch.575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
136. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 237-48 (1973), reprinted in 5 WILLIAM L.
NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 792 (1992).
137. 5 NORTON, supra note 136, at 792.
138. Id. at 792-93.
139. Id. at 793.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which the Chandler Act amended, used Roman
numerals to refer to sections of the law. Chapter XI under the Bankruptcy Act is today's Chapter
11.
145. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
as amended at II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)) ("Bankruptcy Code").
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Bankruptcy Code which we know today.
The Bankruptcy Code contains provisions that, when it was enacted in
1978, were new to the bankruptcy process. Changes in the definitions of
"claim" and "debtor" have opened the door for the use of Chapter 11
reorganization by mass tort defendants. A "debtor" is not required to be
insolvent '" but is merely a "person or municipality concerning which a case
under [Title 11] has been commenced."" 7 Since the enactment of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, many solvent companies have used bankruptcy to
solve litigation problems that may not otherwise have been a threat to the
company's solvency. ' Numerous mass tort defendants have petitioned for
bankruptcy court protection to halt pending
litigation and to allow attempts to
49
,
litigation.
future
and
pending
resolve
B. Bankruptcy Does Not Resolve Future Claims
The goal of mass tort debtors that file for bankruptcy is to achieve a final
resolution of all pending claims and any claims that may be brought in the
future. The tort defendant also desires to affect third party claims and to
eliminate potential indemnification and contribution actions. The Bankruptcy
Code grants jurisdiction over state and federal claims and provides the
authority to aggregate all claims, in certain cases (even third-party actions), in
one court, making bankruptcy courts appear to be an ideal place for final
resolution.' 50 However, bankruptcy does not resolve all claims. Emerging case
law indicates that the resolution of future claims remains dependent on the
strength of the settlement trust rather than on the structure of the Bankruptcy

146. The Johns-Manville Corporation, for example, was trading on the New York
Stock Exchange and listed as a Fortune 500 company in August of 1982,when it filed for
bankruptcy reorganization.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1994): "Person" is defined as an "individual,
partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit." Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 101(41) (1994). However, stock and commodity brokers, railroads, and certain
insurance companies and banks may not be debtors because their liquidation or
reorganization is controlled by separate processes under the supervision of quasigovernmental agencies such as the FDIC and the SEC. Id. § 109(b).
148. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)
(attempting to resolve litigation with Dalkon Shield IUD claimants); In re Texaco, Inc., 79 B.R.
560, 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (attempting to resolve litigation with Penzoil).
149. See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In reA.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994,996
(4th Cir. 1986); In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 553 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997);
Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 66 B.R. 517,521-22
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 ("District courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under Title 1I,
or arising in or related to cases under
Title 11.") See Coarv. National Union FireInsuranceCo., 19 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1994), in which
the district court had "related to" jurisdiction in a tort action against the debtor's insurance
carrier in Los Angeles because damages could exceed policy limits and impact the estate.
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Code.'
1.

In Chapter11, Future ClaimantsMay Opt-Out by Definition

Debtors typically seek to have courts exercise the broadest possible
jurisdiction over claims so that the debtors' discharges are complete and
lasting." 2 However, the definition of "claim" creates a serious problem in mass
tort bankruptcies.' 53 The debtor in a mass tort bankruptcy can be faced with
many future claims but, due to the latency period of some injuries, cannot be

sure of the number of future claims.- 4 It is important to the total solution that
the bankruptcy "discharge"' 5 cover all existing as well as future claims. If all
claims, including future claims, are not discharged in bankruptcy, the successor
to the debtor will face liability for new tort claims as they mature. No specific
definition of future claims is presently found in the Bankruptcy Code.' 56 The
drafters did not consider the issue of future claims, and debate exists as to
whether "claims," as defined in the5Bankruptcy
Code, includes claims that will
7
not mature until some future date.
The broad definition of "claim" contained in the Bankruptcy Code
adequately describes the type of commercial claims the Bankruptcy Code was
intended to resolve. 5 Difficulty arises in cases when a debtor's prepetition

151. See National Gypsum's Record of Confirmation Hearing at 33 (on file with
authors).
152. The pressure by mass tort debtors to bring all possible claims into the bankruptcy
proceeding runs counter to the impetus usually found in bankruptcy cases to exclude claimants
whenever possible. There is a natural incentive in the bankruptcy system for participants in the
case to exclude all creditors who may not understand the nature of their potential claim or have
not already gained knowledge of the existence of the bankruptcy. These existing players,
including the debtor; creditors already parties to the case; the trustee, "who often deems himself
the agent of the firm's principal creditors"; and even the bankruptcy court, "do not want to thrust
additional hands into the till." In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 489 n.2 (7th Cir.
1988). This pressure, typically present even if unspoken, is not as strong in a mass tort
bankruptcy in which the debtor seeks to resolve all claims and claimants seek to protect any trust
established for their benefit from collateral attack or from diversion offunds to satisfy successor
suits.
153. See Thomas A. Smith, A CapitalMarkets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy,
104 YALE L.J. 367, 372 (1994).
154. See generallyFrancis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Tortsfor Judges, 72
TEx.L. REV. 1821, 1827 (1995) (discussing the "elasticity" problem of mass torts).
155. In a Chapter 11 proceeding no actual discharge of a corporation is granted, just
a permanent injunction against pursuing collection of the debt similar to the automatic stay.
156. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recommended that the
Bankruptcy Code be amended to provide definitions for the terms "mass future claim" and
"holders of a mass future claim." NATIONALBANKR. REVIEWCOMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THENEXT
TWENTY YEARS 316(1997) (available at<http://162.140.225.I/report/09bmass.html>). However,
there is no proposal to define "future claim" in general.
157. See H.R. REP.No. 95-595, (1977), reprintedin, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6266; Grady
v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201-03 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R.
618, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
158. See Supra note 9.
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conduct results in injury which manifests or accrues after confirmation.' 9 As
bankruptcy courts have attempted to stretch the definition of "claim" to reach
mass tort injuries, decisional law has crystallized around three alternative tests
to determine whether a claim falls within the § 10 1(5) definition of claim. The
three tests are known as the "accrued
state law test," the "conduct test," and the
60
"prepetition relationship test."'
The prepetition relationship test reflects the courts' most recent efforts to
encompass future claims within the definition of § 101(5).6 ' This test
incorporates the concept of a claim arising as a result of the debtor's prepetition
conduct but, in addition, requires the future claimant to have had some
prepetition relationship with the debtor such as exposure to, contact with, or
purchase of the debtor's product.' 62 It is accepted that claims that arise from
prepetition relationships between the debtor and the claimant fall within the
definition of claim. The question remains whether future claimants who have
no prepetition relationships with the debtor and who are injured subsequent to
the confirmation of a plan have a claim that may be discharged in bankruptcy.
The outcome of the debate over whether the § 101(5) definition of "claim"
includes future claims will directly impact the effectiveness of bankruptcy as
a means of resolving mass tort cases. If the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
63
extends only to present claims and to some categories of future claims,
successive bankruptcies would be needed to resolve incipient claims maturing
after confirmation.
Presently, courts reach "different interpretations of when a claim has arisen
and thus can be dealt with in the bankruptcy case .

. . ."'

This type of

determination creates uncertainty and disparate treatment of future claims from
court to court.' 65 The Bankruptcy Revision Commission suggests that § 101(5)

159. See Avellino & Bienes v. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332,
334 (3d Cir. 1984).
160. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 624-27 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
161. Id. at 625-27.
162. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1003-04
(2d Cir. 1991); In re PiperAircraft Corp., 162 B.R. at 627.
163. See Paris Mfg. Corp. v. Ace Hardware Corp. (In re Paris Indus., Corp.), 132 B.R.
504, 508 (D. Me. 1991); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742,754 (E.D. Va. 1988); Volvo White
Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944,
94748 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
164. NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 323.
165. The application of the definition of claims as it relates to future mass tort claims
was discussed in Kewanee Boiler Corp. v. Smith (In re Kewanee Boiler Corp), 198 B.R. 519,
528 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996), remandedon other grounds,In re Kawanee Boiler Corp., No. 96C5447, 1996 WL 556736 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1996). Speaking in general of the problem of
disparate treatment of future claims, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission found that
[i]n the absence of statutory guidance, courts have
reached vastly different determinations of the ability
to treat and discharge future claims in bankruptcy.
Since the early 1980s, a large handful of courts have
presided over cases dealing with uncertain future
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be amended to add a definition of "holder of a mass future claim" to the
definition of "claim.""16 An amendment would raise a constitutional question,
as discussed in dicta in the Amchem decision.'67 In Amchem the Court
expressed concern regarding adequate notice to future claimants which may not
be injured at the time of the present proceeding. 6 This question of notice
would have equal applicability to a Chapter 11 proceeding attempting to
discharge claims that did not exist at the time the discharge was entered. A
statutory amendment does not accomplish what the Constitution prohibits.
Merely amending the definition of claim to include future claims, without
more, would not satisfy due process.
2. Futures Representatives and Channeling Injunctions Do Not
ProtectAgainst Liabilityfor Future Claims
In attempts to affect all "claims" against the debtors, including "future"
claims, bankruptcy courts have created a process in which a fiduciary is
appointed and given "party-in-interest" status to protect the interests of future
claimants.'69 The appointment of a fiduciary for future claimants in the JohnsManville case was the first use of this appointment process in a mass tort
bankruptcy even though "the concept of the appointment of some kind of
representative for parties in interest whose identities are yet unknown [was] not
unprecedented."' 7 The device was immediately repeated in the A.H. Robins
bankruptcy 7 ' and is now standard procedure in mass tort bankruptcies
involving many future claims. The ability for courts to appoint representatives
for future claimants was codified with the addition of subsection (g) to § 524
of the Bankruptcy Code in 1994, which provides for specific treatment of

liabilities, and some have confirmed plans using
channeling injunctions to protect the reorganized
entity against individual collection attempts while
providing a pool of resources for the claimants'
treatment. Yet, because the Bankruptcy Code did not
contain express authorization for these procedures,
the resulting uncertainty over the legality of the
resolutions restricted access to capital and depressed
public stock value.
NATIONAL BANKR. REvIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 319-20; see also Ralph R. Mabey &
Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the
Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487,495 (1995) (describing how uncertainty of the

law contributed to failure of Manville reorganization).
166. NATIONAL BANKR. REvIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 316.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
Id.
See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id.
See SOBOL, supra note 90, at 110.
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future claimants in asbestos bankruptcies.' The drafters of subsection (g)
recognized the risk of successor liability could endanger the reorganization and
work a hardship on existing claimants.' 7 3 The appointment of a representative
for future claimants is an attempt to provide due process protection for future
claimants and to protect present claimants from unequal treatment.
To protect assets of the reorganized debtor further from piecemeal
dismemberment by successor suits, bankruptcy courts have fashioned a
protective injunction, known as a "channeling injunction," through the exercise
of their "all writs" power. 174 In issuing a
channeling injunction, the bankruptcy courts exercise their § 105 power both
to aid confirmation orders and to enforce statutory provisions intended to
protect the debtor from post confmnation claims.'7 ' All post confirmation
claims against the reorganized debtor are enjoined and directed, or
"channeled," to trusts established for the benefit of those claimants.
The channeling injunction, which is now a fixture of mass tort
bankruptcies, was another innovation of the Johns-Manvillebankruptcy.'76 The
Johns-Manvillecourt found that a channeling injunction could be issued where
the injunction preserves the rights of all asbestos claimants to the corpus of the
funds and in the absence of the injunction, "inequitable, piece-meal
dismemberment of the debtor's estate" would occur. 71 7 Innumerous subsequent
mass tort bankruptcies, trusts were established for payment of present and
future claims, 78 and all claimants' suits, including future claimants, have been
and are channeled to the trusts. In 1994, Congress codified the channeling
injunction in § 524(g) as to asbestos claimants' trusts established under this

172. Bankruptcy Code, I1 U.S.C. § 524(g) (1994). It is important to note that
§ 524(g) is limited to asbestos claims.
173. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3348.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 105. Most of the channeling injunctions presently in place in mass
tort bankruptcies, including asbestos-related bankruptcies, are based on the bankruptcy courts'
§ 105 injunction power, not on § 524(g).
175. The channeling injunction generally lends support to the "free and clear"
language of§ 1141(c) and § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.
176. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 624-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Apparently
the Manville estate had a great deal to fear from future claimants and unidentified claimants. The
open-ended Manville trust, which was intended to be replenished by funds from the ongoing
operations of the reorganized debtor, found itself overwhelmed by claims and out of money
within two years of confirmation of the plan. The channeling injunction has proved more
successful in othercases such asln reA.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742,752 (E.D. Va. 1988), where
the trust fund has proved adequate to satisfy claims on a pro rata basis. However, the channeling
injunction in In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992), has been challenged
and the court has indicated it will lift the injunction if, as presently anticipated, the trust fund
proves to be inadequate to pay all claims.
177. In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 626.
178. See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 596-97 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996);
Keene Corp. v. Acstar Ins. Co. (In re Keene Corp.), 162 B.R. 935, 939-40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994); In re H.K. Porter Co., 156 B.R. 16, 18 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
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statute.1

The effectiveness of a channeling injunction to prevent successor suits may
depend upon the adequacy of the trusts to which the claimants are channeled.
In the In re A.H. Robins Co. bankruptcy plan, 80 the channeling injunction has
remained in place and all claimants to date have been paid from the trust.''
Where trusts are inadequate for the number and value of claims brought against
the trust, channeling injunctions are being challenged, as in the National
Gypsum bankruptcy.
The confirmed plan in National Gypsum provided that the channeling
injunction established under the court's § 105 injunctive authority should be
"terminated as to that Unknown Asbestos Disease Claimant if the [National
Gypsum Company] Asbestos Settlement Fund ceases to exist without or before
resolving that Unknown Asbestos Disease Claim or upon order of this court
finding that the Fund cannot resolve that Unknown Asbestos Disease Claim,
whichever occurs first."'82 When it became obvious that the trust would not be
sufficient to pay the future and unknown claims, the trustees and the futures
representative,joinedby the asbestos claimants, sought an order pursuant to the
bankruptcy court's retained jurisdiction to nullify the channeling order and to
allow the future and unknown claimants to pursue their rights against the
successor corporation. 8 3 At the time the National Gypsum channeling order
was entered, the court recognized the distinction between the discharge and the
§ 105 channeling injunction. 8 ' Discharge, which is a permanent injunction
against future suits, leaves a claimant with no recourse except against the
debtor's successor. Unlike discharge, the channeling injunction directs the
claimant to the substitute recourse for resolution of its claim. In National
Gypsum the future claimants' representative, recognizing the distinction,

179. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
180. In reA.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. at 751.
181. Unlike other mass tort bankruptcies discussed in this Article, In re A.H. Robins
Co. was resolved fairly quickly. The Dalkon Shield IUD device, the subject of the product
liability underlying the A.H. Robins Co. case, was manufactured for a relatively short period
before being removed from the U.S. market. Women were aware whether they were exposed
either to the Dalkon Shield product or some other IUD device. Injury from the IUD device was
usually manifested prior to the bankruptcy, unlike asbestos injuries, which have a possible thirtyto forty-year latency period. In the Dalkon Shield cases the number and magnitude of future
claims were relatively small and more easily resolved than asbestos claims. At this time, the trust
in A.H. Robins Co. is said to be "over-funded." However, because punitive damages were not
calculated in the values of each claim, the overage represents a portion of the punitive damages
to which each claimant remains entitled.
The A.H. Robins Co. trust has generally been a success. The effectiveness test of the
§ 105 channeling injunction in theA.H. Robins Co. case will come in the event a future claimant
makes a claim against the successor company. However, the pool of persons injured by the
Dalkon Shield is so limited that such a challenge is remote.
182. Order Confirming the First Amended and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization
§ I0(b)(2) (on file with authors).
183. See Motion to Terminate Channeling Order at 6 (on file with authors).
184. See Record of Confirmation Hearing at 9 (on file with authors).
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opposed a permanent discharge of future claims but did not oppose a
channeling injunction.' The court declined to confirm a plan containing a
permanent injunction of unknown and future claims, 8 6 holding that it lacked
jurisdiction over future claims because it could not "provide notice to the
claimants consistent with due process to support a permanent injunction."'' 7
The court entered supporting orders directing all claimants, present and future,
to the appropriate trust established for payment of claims.' The order
contained language to the effect that the assets of the debtor were transferred
to the successor "free and clear" of liability. 8 9
When presented with the motion to dissolve the channeling injunction, the
National Gypsum court ruled from the bench that the motion was premature
because it was projected that the trust fund would be adequate to pay claims at
the present rate until the year 2002.19o The court ruled that, should the trust fund
run out, the motion to lift the channeling injunction could be renewed. 9' The
court held that the successor to NationalGypsum is liable for all future claims
because it has not been discharged or otherwise disposed of in the
bankruptcy. 92 This decision is on appeal. If the decision is upheld, the § 105
channeling injunction would be effective only to the extent that the trust to
which claimants are channeled is sufficient to pay claims.
The court in In re FairfieldAircraft Corp. described future claims issues
as "one of bankruptcy's more intractable conundrums."9 4 The court also noted
that
it is the nature of the beast that, in all likelihood, it will never
be possible for a debtor emerging from bankruptcy (or any
successor entity), to know of a certainty that the provisions of
a given plan will effectively cut off claimants... unless and
until a challenge [to the discharge or channeling order] is

185. See Objection to Confirmation of Debtors' First Amended and Restated Joint
Plan of Reorganization at 3 (on file with authors).
186. See Record of Confirmation Hearing at 33 (on file with authors).
187. Id. (on file with authors).
188. See Order Confirming the First Amended and Restated Joint Plan of
Reorganization § l0(b)(1) (on file with authors).
189. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Confirmation ofthe First Amended
and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization at 37-38 (on file with authors).
190. See Order Denying Motion of Legal Representative to Terminate Channeling
Order (on file with authors).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. In re National Gypsum Co., No. 3-98-CV-1031-G (N.D. Tex.).
194. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R.
910, 934 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995). The court declined to discharge future claimants' suits on
claims arising due to pre-bankruptcy actions of the debtor although there was no future claims
representative, and the plan did not provide compensation for future claimants. Id. at 932-34.
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mounted."
If the court is right, as it appears, then mass tort debtors face great uncertainty
as to the effectiveness and finality
of bankruptcy claims resolution for which
196
they put their companies at risk.
C. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Third Parties Causes Delay and
DiscouragesSettlement
Bankruptcy courts have broad jurisdiction to determine all matters that
touch on debtors' estates. 97 The first invocation of this broad jurisdiction
comes in the form of the § 362 automatic stay, which provides the defendant
debtor with immediate relief from all further tort litigation.'98 However, while
suits against the debtor are stayed, codefendants face continued litigation.
Codefendants often include parties related to the debtor, such as officers,
directors, parents or subsidiaries, corporations, or entities that would have
offsetting claims against the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code provides the tort
defendant debtor with powerful tools by which itmay bring codefendants under
the same protection of the automatic stay.'" While these mechanisms are
designed to give the court the ability to resolve expeditiously all claims against
the debtor, they in fact have the opposite effect by removing valuable leverage
for settlement from the claimant's hands.
1. Extension of the Automatic Stay to Codefendants
The imposition of the automatic stay under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code
is the most immediate benefit of filing a bankruptcy petition by a debtor who
is also a defendant in tort actions.2"0 The automatic stay provides an "enormous

195. Id. at 934.
196. Even advocates of mass tort resolution through Chapter 11 acknowledge due
process problems with attempts to discharge future claims. "[A]ssuming due process
considerations can be adequately addressed, a chapter 11 filing ultimately provides the debtor
with a 'discharge' of such current and future mass tort claims through confirmation of a chapter
11 plan of reorganization that effectively deals with those claims." Barbara J. Houser, Chapter
11 As a Mass Tort Solution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 451, 451 (1998).

197. Those matters "arising under" or "arising in" Chapter 11 are referred to as "core"
matters. A list of "core proceedings" is found at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1994). Because "noncore" matters are not defined in the statute, they are for a district court's determination. These
"non-core" matters are primarily causes ofaction either arising under state law or in which there
is a right to ajury trial. See generally 8 COLLIERON BANKRUPTCY 3.01 (James Win. Moore et
al. eds., 14th ed. 1976) (discussing general principles of bankruptcy jurisdiction).
198. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(2); see also id. § 1334(b) (giving district courts original
jurisdiction for proceedings under Title 11).
200. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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benefit,""2 ' immediately halting all litigation pending against the debtor and
prohibiting the commencement of new litigation.0 2 The Bankruptcy Code
provides creditors with a means of modifying or lifting the automatic stay. 0 a
The Code also provides that creditors may move for the court to allow them to
continue or to initiate actions against the debtor in other appropriate courts,20 4
relief that is granted expeditiously in Chapter 11 proceedings in circumstances
such as foreclosures on property with no equity.205 However,2 6mass tort
claimants who seek relief from the stay are seldom granted relief.
The Bankruptcy Code makes no explicit provision for the extension of the
automatic stay to third parties. Attempts outside of mass tort bankruptcies to
make an extension of the debtor's protections to cover related third parties have
met with mixed results. 2 7 Although the In reA.H. Robins Co. court found that
it was necessary to have "unusual circumstances" before the bankruptcy court
would extend the § 362 automatic stay to non-debtor third parties, the extension
of the stay has become common in mass tort bankruptcies.2 8 The arguments
usually advanced for extending the stay are that suits against codefendants
would hamper the debtor's ability to reorganize by creating inconsistent
decisions and that decisions against a third party might "in effect be ajudgment
against [the debtor]."2 9 The bankruptcy court's "all writs" power under § 105

201. Houser, supra note 196, at 452. Ms. Houser is counsel for the debtor in Dow
Coming's Chapter II case. Id. at 451 n.l; see also Pettibone Corp. v. Baker (In re Pettibone
Corp.), 110 B.R. 848, 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) ("[The automatic stay protects the debtor
absolutely."); Oberg v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 828 F.2d 1023, 1026-27
(4th Cir. 1987) (staying post-bankruptcy products liability claim against debtor's insurer).
202. Section 362(a) provides that filing a petition in bankruptcy operates as an
automatic stay that applies to all entities of
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title,
or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title.
II U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
203. Id. § 362(d).
204. Id.
205. See generally3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.03 14]-[5] (Lawrence P. King et
al. eds., 15th ed. 1996) (discussing automatic stay).
206. Houser, supra note 196, at 453.
207. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th
Cir. 1986) (discussing the circumstances under which non-debtor defendants may receive the
benefit of the automatic stay) (citing GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 B.R. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
208. Houser, supra note 196, at 455.
209. Oberg v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 828 F.2d 1023, 1025
(4th Cir. 1987).
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is employed to halt third-party litigation that might impact the debtor's estate.21 °

The broad and liberal application of the court's all writs powers under
§ 105, extending the automatic stay to non-debtor third parties, creates an
imbalance within the finely tuned Bankruptcy Code, a statute designed to
distribute evenly the pain and the gain of the bankruptcy process. The
protections afforded the debtor under the automatic stay and other bankruptcy
provisions come at a price to the debtor. A debtor puts ownership of the
company at risk when it files a bankruptcy.2" ' Ultimately, debtors must confirm
a plan of reorganization in order to receive permanent relief from tort claims.212
However, if the plan is a consensual plan, it is possible for the debtor to
negotiate some equity interest in the reorganized debtor for old shareholders. 13
The debtor also has duties and responsibilities that it must satisfy while it

enjoys the protections of the bankruptcy court, including filing periodic reports
of its financial condition and being available for examination of its financial
affairs. 214' Third parties should not benefit from the debtor's automatic stay
without being subject to the corresponding duties and responsibilities.
Policy underlying bankruptcy disfavors the application of certain
Bankruptcy Code privileges to third parties.2"5 The liberal application of the
courts' all writs power under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, extending the
debtor's automatic stay to non-debtor third-parties, coupled with the
bankruptcy courts' reluctance to modify the automatic stay, is used by mass tort
' 6
defendants as "a powerful tool to gain control over mass tort litigation."21
With
action against third-party defendants halted, and with the bankruptcy courts'

210. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111
B.R. 423,433-34, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Lahman
Mfg. Co.), 33 B.R. 681, 683 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust
(In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777,779-80 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
211. If the plan is confirmed through a "cram-down," the absolute priority rule strips
shareholders of ownership interest in the reorganized company where a superior class of
creditors is not paid in full under the plan. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1994). In
mass tort bankruptcies the value of the unsecured tort claims commonly exceeds the value of the
company, leaving no equity interest for shareholders.
212. See Houser, supra note 196, at 451.
213. See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm.(In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
801 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1986).
214. The reporting requirements that Chapter 11 debtors must satisfy include monthly
operating reports and periodic fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (1994) ("[A] quarterly fee shall
be paid to the United States trustee.... ."); FED.R. BANKR. P. 2015(5). In addition, the debtor
is subject to examination by creditors who may question the debtor extensively about anything
of interest. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004. See, e.g., GHR Energy Corp. v. NLRP (In re GHR Energy
Corp.), 33 B.R. 449,453 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (discussing application of Bankruptcy Rule of
Procedure 2004).
215. Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." 11 U.S.C. § 524(e). This
section was abrogated in a very narrow way, allowing third-party discharge under specific
circumstances, including asbestos mass tort claimants. See id. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii).
216. Houser, supra note 196, at 455.
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customary refusal to lift the automatic stay, tort claimants are denied the
leverage necessary to bring about serious settlement negotiations. Neither the
debtor nor its codefendants, safely protected by both the automatic stay and an
indefinite exclusive period, is eager to discuss the terms upon which they will
cede ownership interest in the debtor corporation.
The In re A.H. Robins Co. court was the first to find "unusual
circumstances"justifying the extension of the automatic stay to third parties." 7
However, since that decision courts have liberally applied the "unusual
circumstances" rule to extend the stay in many mass tort cases.218 Bankruptcy
courts tend to find in favor of assisting the reorganization rather than assisting
the claimants' pursuit of non-debtor tortfeasors.219 The rationale used by the
courts for favoring the defendant-debtor and its codefendants is that
reorganization serves the higher good of protecting the debtor company from
either inconsistent judgments or findings of liability against codefendants,
which precludes the debtor from raising a denial in later suits, both of which
undermine the debtor's reorganization efforts.22 When the debtors' liability has
been determined repeatedly, as in a mature tort, the argument that protection
of codefendants prevented findings of liability and inconsistent decisions is
invalid. The primary motivation behind the courts' extension of protection to
third parties seems to be the policy, either conscious or unconscious, that favors
reorganization of the debtor over other concerns. This bias in favor of the
debtor creates an imbalance which may work against the reorganization
process.
2.

"'Relatedto" Jurisdiction Under28 U.S.C. § 1334

In addition to extending the debtor's automatic stay to non-debtor third
parties, the bankruptcy court may transfer third-party actions to its jurisdiction
even though the bankruptcy court cannot decide the cases. Transfer of pending
actions to the bankruptcy court is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) of
Title 28. 2 ' This provision is known as the bankruptcy court's "related to"
jurisdiction, from the description of the jurisdiction as encompassing all matters
"related to" the bankruptcy case. The phrase "related to" is not defined in the
217. A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In reA.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994,999 (4th Cir.

1986).
218. See, e.g., Organized Maintenance, Inc. v. Ford (In re Organized Maintenance,
Inc.), 47 B.R. 791,797-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. at450-51.
219. See, e.g., Plessey Precision Metals, Inc. v. Metal Ctr., Inc. (In re Metal Ctr.,
Inc.), 31 B.R. 458, 462 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (stating that "the debtor's protection must be
extended to enjoin litigation against others if the result would be binding upon the debtor's
estate").
220. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 788 F.2d at 999.
221. "Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
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Bankruptcy Code, but courts have interpreted it broadly. For example, the

Supreme Court recently interpreted "related to" jurisdiction as "a grant of some
breadth"222 and adopted the Third Circuit's test for determining what is "related
to" the bankruptcy proceeding2' but admonished that "related to" jurisdiction
is not "limitless." 4 The Seventh Circuit has also cautioned "against an openended interpretation of the 'related-to' statutory language 'in a universe where
everything is related to everything else"' ' and that "'[a] court cannot write its
own jurisdictional ticket.' ' 6 These admonitions to apply "related to"

jurisdictionjudiciously have not been heeded. The "open-ended interpretation"
referred to in In re Fedpak Systems, Inc. found a home in the Sixth Circuit's
recent decision to bring all claims concerning silicon breast implants into the
bankruptcy case.227 While recognizing the Third Circuit's decision in Pacor,
the Sixth Circuit created a distinct split with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
on the issue of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in third party, nondebtor
actions by granting "related to"jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court over unripe,
potential claims which might arise as a result of indemnification or contribution
between the debtor and a nondebtor party." The In re Dow Corning Corp.
decision goes beyond individual indemnification claims, bringing under the
bankruptcy court's control all of the silicon gel breast implant injury cases filed
in federal courts or consolidated in the multidistrict litigation in Alabama,
including cases against manufacturers other than Dow Coming.n 9 The

Bankruptcy Code's "related to" jurisdiction accomplishes the removal of mass

222. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995).
223. The test asks
[w]hether the outcome of... [the civil] proceeding
could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy ....
Thus, the proceeding
need not necessarily be against the debtor or against
the debtor's property. An action is related to
bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's
rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively) and which in any way
impacts upon the handling and administration of the
bankruptcy estate.
Id. at 308 n.6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.
1984)).
224. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308.
225. In re Fedpak Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 214-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gerald T.
Dunne, The Bottomless Pit ofBankruptcy Jurisdiction,112 BANKING L.J. 957, 957 (1995)).
226. In re FedpakSys., Inc., 80 F.3d at 215 (quoting Zerand-Bemal Group, Inc. v.
Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 164 (7th Cir. 1994)).
227. Lindsey v. O'Brien (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482,493-94 (6th Cir.
1996).
228. Id. Whatever the impetus for the decisions of the district court and the court of
appeals, this case is in direct opposition to the Third Circuit's decision in Pacor,Inc., 743 F.2d
984 (3d Cir. 1984), which also involved unripe indemnification claims against a debtor.
229. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1099
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
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tort cases from other federal dockets. However, the plaintiff is deprived of the
right to choice of forum against third-party defendants who did not seek
protection from the bankruptcy court, yet who enjoy the benefits of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. When tort cases are transferred to the
bankruptcy court under its "related to" jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court
aggregates to itself cases that, as a non-Article III court,"0 the bankruptcy court
has no jurisdiction to decide.
The policy underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1334 of Title 28 is to accomplish a
"prompt, fair and complete resolution of all claims 'related to' bankruptcy
proceedings."'" Third-party defendants who come into the bankruptcy process
through a broad application of "related to" jurisdiction are under no pressure
to create a claims-resolution plan. A stay of litigation removes any incentive for
third-party defendants to settle claims, a result contrary to the purpose and
underlying policy of § 1334.
3. Successor LiabilityMay Not Be Cut Off by Bankruptcy
Tortfeasors have no complete assurance of relief from future claims for
product liability under present bankruptcy law. If, as many bankruptcy courts
have found, a future claim is not a claim within the meaning of the Bankruptcy
Code2 2 and is thus outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the debtor's
liability for future claims is unchanged by bankruptcy. The successor to the
debtor may be liable for tort claims based on an act of its predecessor.
Successor liability not only works a hardship on the successor corporation
but is also an injustice to the claimants whose claims were disposed of in
bankruptcy for only a percentage of their value and who are forced to take a pro
rata distribution. Future and other unknown claimants that bring successor
liability actions may receive 100% of their claims against assets of the
reorganized entity because the claims are not limited by the boundaries of the
debtor's estate. 3 This inequity creates a superior class of future claimants and

230. See John T. Cross, Viewing FederalJurisdictionThrough the Looking Glass of
Bankruptcy, 23 SETON HALL L. Rv. 530, 557-58 (1993).
231. In reDow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d at 497.
232. See, e.g., In re Eagle Picher Indus.,Inc., 134 B.R. 255, 257 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1991).
233. J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash ofSuccessorLiabilityPrinciples,Reorganization
Law, and the Just Demand That ReliefBe Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12
BANK. DEv. J. 1,35 (1995).
In the context of bankruptcy sales and plan
transactions, the survival of servitudes creates
inequalities between the presently known claims and
the unknown and unknowable claims. Unknown
claimants (those who have been injured but are not
known to the debtor) and unknowable claimants
(those who have not yet been injured) may recover in
full against the successor at the expense of the known
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results in a de facto priority for future and unknown claimants to the
disadvantage of present claimants.
D. Extensions ofExclusivity Creates Delay
In addition to the automatic stay and "related to" jurisdiction, the debtor
has another important tool with which to delay resolution of the mass tort
claims. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor has a period of 120 to
180 days within which to propose and gain approval of a plan of
reorganization." 5 During this period, the debtor has the exclusive right to
propose a plan of reorganization. 6 In complex bankruptcy cases this period is
routinely extended. While the debtor enjoys the benefits of the § 362 automatic
stay and the exclusive right to file a plan, it may comfortably continue its
business without fear of displacement by its creditors or competing plans of
reorganization. This privilege tilts the bankruptcy process in favor of the debtor
and is a disincentive to engage in serious settlement negotiation.
Empirical evidence compiled by Harvard Law School Professor Lynn M.
LoPucki shows that when the exclusive period is lifted, confirnation of a plan
of reorganization occurs very quickly. 7 Drawing statistical information from
the Bankruptcy Research Database, Professor LoPucki charted exclusivityperiod information for eight mass tort bankruptcy cases. 238 The study found that
in cases where the exclusive period is not lifted, the average period of time to
achieve a confirmed plan of reorganization was approximately four and onehalf years.239 Where the exclusive period is lifted to allow competing plans,
confirmed plans of reorganization are filed within an average of thirteen
months from the date the exclusive period is lifted.24 These statistics
demonstrate that lifting the exclusive period reinstates a level playing field
upon which consensual settlement plans can be achieved.

creditors who will receive a ratable share of the
purchase price. This share will be determined only
after the purchase price has been adjusted downward
due to the unknown and unknowable claims.
Id.
234. Thomas A. Smith, A CapitalMarkets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104
YALE L.J. 367, 420 (1994).

235. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (d) (1994).
236. Id. § 1121(b).
237. Does Lifting Exclusivity FosterChaosor Cooperation?,BANKR. CT. DECISIONS
WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, June 16, 1998, at Al, Al, A9-A10. Data were compiled and utilized
to support plaintiffs' position in a hearing on a motion to end the exclusive period in the Dow
Corning Chapter 11 proceeding.
238. The debtors in the cases analyzed were UNR Industries, Manville Corp., A.H.
Robins, Hillsborough Holdings, National Gypsum, Lone Star Industries, Eagle Picher Industries,
and Dow Coming Corporation. Id. at Al1.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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Chapter1] Does Not Offer a Superior Valuation Procedure
1.

Valuation of Claims

Development of a successful Chapter 11 plan of reorganization can be
dependent upon establishing the debtor's tort liability. The Bankruptcy Code
provides that a debtor may estimate its contingent, unliquidated debt under
§ 502(c). 241 Claims estimation is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(B),242 one in which the bankruptcy court, as an Article I court,4 3
has original jurisdiction. The estimation proceeding is not a trial on liability or
an award of specific damages to individuals. The estimation of claims
conducted in the bankruptcy court is intended solely for the purpose of voting
on and determining the feasibility of the plan.244 The bankruptcy court may not
convene a jury trial in a personal injury or wrongful death case. 24' The
determination of tort liability and actual damages due to individual personal
injury or wrongful death is reserved to the Article III district court. 4 6 While the

tort victim retains his or her right to ajury trial, the Bankruptcy Code does not
require that there be an actual trial in the district court.
The inability of the bankruptcy courtto liquidate tort claims and the courts'
routine denial of modification of the automatic stay guarantees that there will
not be access to a jury trial during the pendency of the bankruptcy, which can
last a number of years. It is common practice to provide for a jury trial as a

241. Section 502(c) reads in pertinent part: "There shall be estimated for purpose of
allowance under this section-(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation
of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case ......
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1994).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1994); see In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R.
527, 533 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) ("[T]he estimation of claims, including the estimation of
personal injury tort claims for the purpose of confirming a plan under Chapter 11, is a core
proceeding."). But see Roberts v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 45 B.R.
823, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that § 157(b)(2)(B) does not exclude from the definition of
core proceedings estimation "for purposes of distribution").
243. Charles R. Haywood, Comment, The PowerofBankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees
Under the EqualAccess to Justice Act, 61 U. CHi. L. REv. 985, 993-94 (1994).
244. In re Eagle Picher Indus.,Inc., 164 B.R. 255,272 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that
"the estimation of contingent liabilities pursuant to § 502(c) is a method of treating direct
contingent claims rather than the claims of co-liable parties").
245. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5):
The district court shall order that personal injury tort
and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in
the district court in the district in which the claim
arose, as determined by the district court in which the
bankruptcy case is pending.
246. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/7

38

Rice and Davis: The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Ac

1999]

MASS TORT CLAIMS

component of a claims resolution facility created by a plan of reorganization, 247
but there is no requirement to do so.
The In re Johns-ManvilleChapter 11 reorganization was the first complex
mass tort bankruptcy to raise important issues surrounding mass tort claims,
including the issue of how to value claims for voting purposes. When faced
with valuing individual claims, the court inln reJohns-Manvilledid not pursue
individual trials to determine claim values.248 Instead, recognizing that the
method it contemplated would not comply with the strict letter of the
bankruptcy law,249 the court valued each claim at one dollar for purposes of
achieving the required vote to approve the plan. The court collapsed the
requirement that "two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of
the allowed claims" of each class approve the plan' and required instead that
two-thirds in number of claim holders must accept the plan.2 2 The Bankruptcy
Code does not provide a mechanism for modifying the plan-approval
procedure. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court ignored the statutory voting
requirements.2 3 This extra-statutory process should be disallowed as contrary
to the express requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. The willingness of
bankruptcy courts to find unorthodox, contra-statutory solutions to make
bankruptcy work is typical of the willingness on the part of the bench and bar
to apply bankruptcy law liberally and loosely in connection with mass tort
reorganizations.254

247. See SOBOL, supra note 90, at 332 (noting that a plan of organization could
include a provision granting claimants who do not accept settlement the right to a jury trial
against the trust).
248. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). The In
reJohns-Manville claimants also did not pursue the filing of proofs of claim. Subsequent mass
tort bankruptcies followed this example and deferred filing the completely documented proof of
claim in the bankruptcy until it could be directed to the claimant's trust established under a plan
of reorganization. The estimation process at the bankruptcy court level substitutes for the
complete filing, but may not be used as a basis for "distribution." However, it is used as a basis
for the district court, which can conduct jury trials and determines final distribution amounts. In
practice, the district court conducts very few determinations ofcausation and liability, with most
claims resolved within the reorganization plan's administrative claims resolution process.
249. Id. (discussing objections based on I I U.S.C. §§ 501, 502, and 1126).
250. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 641
(2d Cir. 1988).
251. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
252. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 631.

253. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 646-47. The modification mechanism
is sometimes not challenged because it usually makes no difference in the vote. The sheer weight
of numbers is enough to carry or defeat a plan. However, this precedent can be very damaging
to tort claimants if applied to a fact pattern where the claimant's votes can be diluted by a onedollar--to-one-vote scheme.
254. The title of Richard Sobol's book, BENDING THE LAw, is an apt description of
the mass tort bankruptcy process. See SOBOL, supra note 90.
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Valuing the Companyfrom a LiquidationPoint of View

The Bankruptcy Code drafters developed the concept of reorganization
from the perspective of a liquidation and framed Chapter 11 in terms of a
limited pool paradigm. This liquidation-based perception of reorganization is
inappropriate for resolution of mass tort claims.25 Future claimants play a
much greater role in mass tort claims analysis than in conventional
bankruptcies, yet there is no provision in the "fixed pool" concept for
replenishing the supply or renewal of assets over a period which would satisfy
future claimants' demands. The fixed pool is the present value of the estate. At
a minimum, creditors get what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 6
This paradigm is inappropriate and unfair to both present and future claimants
who have recourse to the same pool.257 While the debtormay have accumulated
the debt to tort victims over a period of years and may anticipate further
accumulation of injury-based debt in future years due to injuries that have not
yet manifested, the distribution to claimants will be from a limited pool based
on the value of the claims or the value of the company at the time of the
bankruptcy, whichever is greater. The future claimants have a portion of the
pool reserved for them, in most cases by a fiduciary who can only estimate
epidemiologically who will be a claimant in the future. This "set aside" of an
estimated amount for future claimants reduces the amount available to present
claimants. If history is any indicator, this is also unfair to future claimants.
Asbestos trusts established to satisfy future claims in cases such as In reJohnsManville Corp. and In re NationalGypsum Co. are experiencing or anticipate
shortfalls due to underestimation of claims against the trust.258 The issue is
whether a Chapter 11 reorganization should be used to dispose of future claims.
In a Chapter 7 liquidation, only present claims would be paid, and the company
would cease to exist. If a policy decision is made to pay future claims, the next
issue is how the Bankruptcy Code can provide for future claims on the same
basis that present claims are paid. The solution developed in In re JohnsManville Corp.'" is to tum all or partial ownership of the debtor over to the

255. 11 U.S.C. § l129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
256. Id. The limited pool paradigm underlying bankruptcy law is an inappropriate
foundation for the application of bankruptcy law to distribution of mass tort.
257. The arguments advanced here maybe validly applied to a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) no-

opt-out class. The solution in both cases is the same. Ownership of the entire company must be
transferred to claimants to satisfy all claims, present and future. This seems unlikely in a Rule

23(b)(1)(B) settlement class when the company negotiates for the purpose of saving equity. The
same result occurs in a bankruptcy where the absolute priority rule is in force. However, in a
bankruptcy proceeding, debtors have the benefit of both the automatic stay and the extended
exclusive period and can use these advantages to delay tort claimants into abandonment of their

equity interest to former shareholders.

258. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 120 B.R. 648,
652 (l3ankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing fiscal problems of the Manville Trust); In re National
Gypsum Co. Motion to Terminate Channeling Order (on file with authors).
259. In re Joluis-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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trust. In In re Johns-Manville Corp. eighty percent of the stock of the
reorganized debtor was transferred to the claimants' trust.26 When no equity
remains in the debtor after the value of the company is set against the value of
the tort claims, the entire reorganized company should be turned over to the
claimants. The company would then operate to generate profits to pay its new
owners, the tort claimants, ensuring that future claimants are paid to the fullest
extent possible from the assets of the reorganized company. Taking ownership
in the debtor breaks the fixed-pool paradigm and creates an equitable payout
to claimants.
F. Non-Traditional Chapter 11s Offer Solutions Similar to Settlement
Class Actions
1.

Class Action Within Chapter 11 Bankruptcies

A bright line demarcation between a class action and a bankruptcy
proceeding is not necessary. The two may exist in the same case either
explicitly through the court's discretionary application of Rule 23261 or
implicitly through the informal treatment of a group of tort claimants as a
consolidated entity, such as through the use of a claimants' committee. While
the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the subject, courts have permitted a
prepetition certified class of claimants to continue to act as a class within the
bankruptcy context."' Where the certification of a class has been interrupted
by the filing of a bankruptcy, or where a class certification otherwise has not
occurred outside of bankruptcy, a class may be certified within the bankruptcy
context.263
The Bankruptcy Code contains no provision specifically allowing or
prohibiting classes, as opposed to individuals, to act as creditors in a
bankruptcy. 26 Faced with statutory silence, bankruptcy courts initially ruled
against class representatives who attempted to file proofs of claim on behalf of
their constituents.265 With the increase in the 1980s of bankruptcy filings by
mass tort class action defendants, courts faced this issue with increasing
frequency, yet the courts of appeal which have considered the issue since the

260. Id. at 621.
261. See, e.g., In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 488 (7th Cir. 1988).
262. A certified class of claimants may file a proof of claim on behalf of a class, In
re Trebol Motors Distrib. Corp., 211 B.R. 785, 787 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1997), and may also bring
an adversary proceeding to reverse certain voidable transfers, Moore v. Ross (In re Ross), 37
B.R. 656, 657 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984). A class may also act as an entity to bring an action seeking
declaration of non-dischargeability against a debtor. Dickinson v. Duck (In re Duck), 122 B.R.
403,406 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990).
263. In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 125 B.R. 575, 580 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
264. In re Computer Devices, Inc., 51 B.R. 471,474 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
265. For a good summary of earlier cases, see Joel Rothstein Wolfson, ClassActions
in Bankruptcy: A Clash ofPoliciesReconciled, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 391, 393-414 (1988).
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enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code are nearly unanimous in their approval
of class proofs of claim.266 While there is a strong consensus that class proofs
of claim may be filed in a bankruptcy, the reasoning required to reach that
conclusion is convoluted. The authority for the recognition of an active class
entity in a bankruptcy proceeding is found in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7023. Because Rule 23 comes into play through the initiation of an
adversary proceeding or a contested matter,267 it may be necessary that an
objection to the class claim be made in order to trigger the contested matter.
This overlap of rules places the class in the odd position of either waiting for
the debtor to raise the objection at the time most advantageous to itself or
having to precipitate a contested matter by asking the court to approve the class
proof of claim, thus alerting the debtor to a problem it might not otherwise have
seen. Amendment of the rules to provide that representatives of a class may file
proofs of claim on behalf of the class is necessary to clarify the situation and
to give classes direct access to standing in the bankruptcy process.
In the seminal decision on class action claims in bankruptcy, the In re
American Reserve Corp. court analogized the function of a bankruptcy to a
class action and found that "[t]he principal function of bankruptcy law is to
determine and implement in a single collective proceeding the entitlements of
all concerned" and that "[p]rocedurally, the class action concentrates litigation
in a single forum, where it may be resolved more readily than a series of suits
could be."26 While the court found that "[t]he bankruptcy forum, as a
mandatory collective proceeding, serves this purpose without the overlay of the
class action," it recognized that in certain circumstances, the bankruptcy
proceeding does not serve the same purpose as a class action and that the
overlay of class action procedures is necessary to achieve a "single collective

266. See, e.g., Birting Fisheries, Inc., v. Lane (In re Birting Fisheries Inc.), 92 F.3d
939, 939 (9th Cir. 1996); Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1469 (6th Cir. 1989);
Certified Class in the Charter Sec. Litig. v. Charter Co. (In re Charter Co.), 876 F.2d 866, 873
(11 th Cir. 1989); In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 488 (7th Cir. 1988).
267. In reAmerican Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d at 488.
Bankruptcy Rule 9014, which applies to "a contested
matter in a case.., not otherwise governed by these
rules" states that "[t]he court may at any stage in a
particular matter direct that one or more of the other
rules in Part VII shall apply." Rule 9014 thus allows
bankruptcy judges to apply Rule 7023-and thereby
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the class action rule-to "any
stage" in contested matters ....
All disputes in
bankruptcy are either adversary proceedings or
contested matters, so Rule 23 may apply throughout
a bankruptcy case at the bankruptcy judge's
discretion.
Id. (citations omitted).
268. Id at 489 (citing American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553-54
(1974)).
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proceeding" where the entitlement of everyone concerned is determined.26 9
Having established that it is possible to have a class certified and
functioning within a bankruptcy case, the logical question is why would one
want to do that? The answer is simple. The purpose of a class within

bankruptcy is the same as outside of bankruptcy: to manage litigation and to
represent the interests of large numbers of small claimants.27
Some might argue that the Bankruptcy Code gives the court the authority,
either at the request of a party-in-interest or sua sponte, to appoint a
"champion" for the mass tort victims, thereby providing for the representation
of a group of claimants without the "overlay" of class action procedure. The
bankruptcy court may order the United States trustee to appoint a claimants'
committee to represent the interests of present mass tort creditors and the

appointment of a future claimants representative.27,
Membership on a claimants' or creditors' committee has no statutory
requirements other than a member must be a creditor who holds one of the
"seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on such
committee., 27 2 "The members of a committee of unsecured creditors need not
2 73
have parallel interests in order to qualify for membership on the committee.
In fact, a broad spectrum of types of claims held by members of the committee
is required, resulting in representation by the single committee of all types of
unsecured claims. 274 Although, most often, claimants' committees are

composed of personal injury attorneys representing claimants in the case,
bankruptcy courts may appoint mass tort claimants to the claimants'
committees in lieu of, or in addition to, attorneys for claimants.275 Rule 23 class
action within a bankruptcy context would require that the representative of the

269. Id.
270. Because bankruptcy is a litigation process, class action certification in
bankruptcy serves the same traditional purpose ofmanaging litigation within the bankruptcy that
it does outside of bankruptcy. See In re American Reserve Corp. for a discussion ofthe need for
a "champion" within. Id. at 490 ("Plaintiffs and their champions at the bar hold the benefits of
class litigation in higher esteem than do courts.").
271. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1994); see Van Arsdale v. Clemo (In
re A.H. Robins Co.), 65 B.R. 160, 162-63 (E.D. Va. 1986); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R.
743, 749 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
272. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1).
273. In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560,567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing In re Schatz
Fed. Bearings Co., 5 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
274. See, e.g., In re Microboard Processing, Inc., 95 B.R. 283,286 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1989).
275. In the In re A.H. Robins bankruptcy personal injury attorneys representing
Dalkon Shield claimants were removed from the claimants' committee and replaced by a five
member committee composed ofthree claimants and two personal injury attorneys. For a general
discussion of the In re A.H. Robins bankruptcy see MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE
GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985). More recently, a claimants' committee was
appointed in the Celotex bankruptcy which consisted only of asbestos claimants. The authors
have sat on and chaired committees comprised of only claimants' counsel. One of the authors,
Nancy Worth Davis, chaired the Dalkon Shield Claimants' Committee as a claimant.
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class meet all the criteria established in a class action, including representation
as well as commonality, numerosity, and typicality. 276 Typically a certified
class within a bankruptcy enjoys better representation than other creditors who
are represented by a creditors' or claimants' committee.
The less formal criteria for the appointment of a claimants' committee in
a traditional bankruptcy would seem preferable to the more exacting process
of certifying a class within the bankruptcy context. However, there are
advantages to the class action process which may justify the added time and
expense. While both types of representatives assume a fiduciary duty toward
the claimants, the class action representatives have more authority to act on
behalf of the class as a whole. A certified class representative may vote for the
class and file a unitary proof of claim for the class, 77 eliminating the need for
individual filings and allowing class members to vote individually if they wish.
In contrast, a creditors' or claimants' committee may merely recommend a
voting position to its constituents. Whether or not a claimant votes is up to the
claimant, but claimants' failure to vote could result in passage of an unwanted
plan. On the other hand, a class representative may vote on behalf of all class
members who do not file individual claims so that the force of numbers may
carry an acceptable plan or defeat an unacceptable one.278
2. PrepackagedBankruptcy
The Chapter 11 process does not need to be as long and attenuated as it
presently is. The Bankruptcy Code provides for an expedited, prenegotiated
form of Chapter 11 known as a prepackaged bankruptcy.2 79 There has been an
upsurge inthe use ofprepackaged bankruptcies in the cases of corporations that
became over-leveraged in the late 1980s and found it necessary to clear their
bottom line of debt through the bankruptcy process.280 When a prepackaged
bankruptcy is applied to a mass tort case, it may offer many of the advantages
of settlement class action without the delays and high transaction costs
experienced by mass tort victims in a traditional litigation-oriented bankruptcy.
The first application of prepackaged bankruptcy process to mass tort claims
occurred very recently. On September 9, 1998, Fuller-Austin Insulation
Company filed its prepackaged bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the

276. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
277. See, e.g., In re Trebol Motors Distrib. Corp., 211 B.R. 785, 788 (Bankr. D. P.R.
1997).
278. See, e.g., In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 125 B.R. 575, 583 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1991).
279. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994).
280. JefFeeley, Debt-Ridden Cos. Turning to Prepacks,NAT'L L. J., Sept. 7, 1998,
at B1.
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District of Delaware.2 ' A hearing to approve the plan282 of reorganization was
held on October 15, 1998. The negotiations and certification of the consensual
plan took less than one year. The Fuller-Austin prepackaged bankruptcy is the
only example of how a prepackaged bankruptcy works. To draw
generalizations from a single sample would be inappropriate. However, a
review of the Fuller-Austin experience may provide insight into the advantages
and disadvantages prepackaged bankruptcies may hold for mass tort claimants.
In October 1997, attorneys for Fuller-Austin invited attorneys representing
large numbers of asbestos claimants to a meeting for the purpose of negotiating
aprepackaged, Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Unlike similar small asbestos
manufacturers, Fuller-Austin had a parent company willing to infuse cash to rid
itself of a balance sheet liability which might impede its planned initial public
offering. At the time that negotiations began, legal action against the company
was not stayed as it would have been immediately upon the filing of a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition. Instead, plaintiffs' attorneys agreed among themselves
to cease new case filings .283 This voluntary injunction against new cases did not
prevent pending cases from proceeding to judgment and did not stay appeals.
In essence, the plaintiffs' counsel gave themselves the equivalent of a
bankruptcy lift stay to continue pending litigation to its final conclusion short
of execution against the company.284 This arrangement had two advantages.
First, it relieved the company and plaintiffs' counsel of further litigation costs
in anticipation of a settlement. Second, it permitted finalization of pending
litigation which in a traditional bankruptcy would remain an estimate because
these types of cases cannot be liquidated by the bankruptcy court.
Over the next year, the company, its parent, the mass tort creditors, and the
representative for future claimants that was designated by the company
negotiated a plan of reorganization. The proposed plan provides for a trust to
compensate the mass tort claimants.28 The plan proposed that the trust be
funded by insurance proceeds and by a cash contribution by the parent
company. In August 1998 the disclosure statement, the plan of reorganization,
and ballots were distributed to all creditors. The creditors' deadline for voting

281. Fuller-Austin Insulation Company Voluntary Petition (on file with authors). The
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is one ofthe venues of choice for debtors wishing
to file a prepackaged bankruptcy. Feeley, supra note 280, at BI. The bench and the bar in
Delaware have developed a particular expertise in this form of bankruptcy.
282. If the plan is confirmed, Fuller-Austin will be in bankruptcy less than two
months.
283. Telephone Interview withJim Wimberly, Provost-Humphries (Oct. 9,1998). Mr.
Wimberly served as a member of the plaintiff's committee.
284. It is important to note that this "stay" agreement was between plaintiffs' counsel
only and was not with the company. This agreement was easily policed by the attorneys because
of the limited distribution of the product and the limited jurisdictions in which an action could
be filed.
285. Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code
for Fuller-Austin Insulation Company at 5-7 (on file with authors).
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was August 31, 1998.286 The plan was overwhelmingly approved by the
creditors.287 The petition, the disclosure statement, the plan of reorganization,
the notice to creditors, an affidavit of the accountants who had counted the
ballots, and the usual first day orders were simultaneously filed with the
bankruptcy court on September 9, 1998.288 The entire bankruptcy package was
delivered to the court in much the same way that parties arrive at a settlement
in a settlement class action and present it to the court for approval along with
an application for certification.
At this point the differences in settlement class actions and prepackaged
bankruptcies become apparent. In a settlement class action the court would
begin scrutinizing the representatives of the class.289 In the Fuller-Austin
prepackaged bankruptcy, the court approved the legal representative for future
claimants,290 the counsel for the legal representatives,29' and the first day orders,
without extensive scrutiny of the representatives. 2' The judge signed all orders
on September 9, 1998 with the only contingency being that the future
claimants' representative procure insurance. Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which triggers appointment of the future claimants' representative, does
not state how either the future claimants' representative or counsel should be
appointed or any criteria for their selection. 293 Fuller-Austin did not pursue the
appointment of counsel for the future claimants' representative through
§ 105(a) or § 327 of the Bankruptcy Code. Uncertainty exists about the
statutory basis of appointment of counsel for the future claimants'
representatives; therefore, it is questionable on what authority the future
claimants' representatives' counsel was appointed in the Fuller-Austin
bankruptcy.
This fault is endemic to the bankruptcy process in general and is not unique
to prepackaged bankruptcy. What the prepackaged bankruptcy seems to offer
in terms of saved time and transaction costs may be gained by sacrificing the

286. Declaration of Logan & Company, Inc. Certifying the Methodology for the
Tabulation of, and Results of Voting with Respect to the Debtor's Plan of Reorganization at I
(on file with authors).
287. Id. at apps. A, B, C.
288. Id. at 1.
289. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
290. Order Approving and Authorizing the Appointment of a Legal Representative
at 1-5.
291. Order Authorizing the Retention and Employment of Herb & Gitlin, P.C. as
Counsel to the Legal Representative at 1-2.
292. This type of approval requires notice and opportunity for a hearing, both of
which were provided in this case. As is routine in matters like these, there was no objection to
the representatives of the committee or to the committees' counsel. The court entered these
orders on the first day of the bankruptcy. This process provided little or no scrutiny of the
"representative" of the claimants' group.
293. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (1994). This defect in the statute is not
exclusive to prepackaged bankruptcies. In fact, it is common to the traditional Chapter I I to
which § 524(g) applies equally.
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court's scrutiny of the future claimants' representative and professionals hired
in the case. Just as in a traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy, there is a lower
degree of scrutiny of the representative process in a prepackaged bankruptcy
than in a settlement class action. It will be interesting to watch the development
of prepackaged bankruptcy as it is applied to mass tort claims. 294
IV. COMPARISON OF SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTION AND

CHAPTER 11

BANKRUPTCY
A. The Structure ofSettlement Class Action and Chapter 11
The evolution and application of settlement class action procedure and
Chapter 11 reorganization to resolve mass tort claims have developed in a
surprisingly analogous manner. Both began as innovative applications of
existing law to meet a new set of facts. Chapter 11 reorganization did not exist
in a statute prior to 1936 when it evolved out of a seemingly collusive practice
between opposingparties in a liquidation proceeding.29 Using a creditor's bill,
originally designed to liquidate assets, debtors and their major creditors
29 6
engineered the appointment of trustees to operate and reorganize the debtor.
The purpose was to benefit the creditors and to enlarge the estate by
distributing the income of the debtor over a period of time. When the
experiment proved successful, the innovation was enacted into law.
Similarly, settlement class action has evolved under Rule 23, which
traditionally focused on litigation of claims. As it has evolved, settlement class
action shifts the focus from manageability of litigation to the question of
whether the settlement reached by the parties is fair and was negotiated at arms
length. This novel use of existing law to settle rather than to litigate claims has
generated the same suspicion of collusion among the parties that greeted the
initial use of bankruptcy law to reorganize rather than to liquidate debtors.297
The process of validation and codification of settlement class action continues.
The Supreme Court has recently approved the principle, 29 ' and the Rules

294. At this point in the evolutionary process, the insurers of the debtor are accusing
the debtor and the mass tort claimants of "collusion" in the Fuller-Austin settlement process.
This is the common litany that seems to accompany innovations in the law. For discussion of the
history of Chapter 11 and settlement class action see supra Part II.A-B.
295. Securities and Exchange Commission Report on the Study and Investigation,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees: Part I, Strategy and
Techniques ofProtective and Reorganization Committees 24-26 and 29 (May 10, 1937) (on file
with authors).
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 836.
298. InAmchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Supreme Court

found that district courts have been certifying mass tort cases "in increasing number" since the
1970s, id. at 625, that "the 'settlement only' class has become a stock device," id. at 618, that
"the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification," id.
at 625, and that the issue of management of litigation was not applicable in a settlement class
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Advisory Committee has recommended an amendment to Rule 23 to provide
for the certification of a class for settlement purposes.299

Settlement class action and Chapter 11, when applied to mass torts, share
some striking similarities.3" Both are aggregative methods of resolving claims;
both rely on representatives of large numbers of claimants; 31 both require the
determination of a court as to the fairness and adequacy of the proposed
settlement or plan of distribution;0 2 and both may rely upon future claimants'
representatives, channeling injunctions, and claimants' trusts to attempt to
resolve future claims. Additionally, both would require some degree of revision
and reorientation ofprevailing biases andperceptions in order to accommodate
adequately the resolution of future mass tort claims.
While settlement class action and Chapter 11 are similar in many respects,
the differences between them bear attention. Where Rule 23(b)(3) settlement
class actions provide a voluntary settlement process from which dissenters may
opt-out, bankruptcy is a mandatory process in which no form of "opt-out" is
provided. "No opt-out" class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) are also
mandatory proceedings in which claimants are bound by the settlement with no
direct recourse to ajury trial as is available to a Rule 23(b)(3) class. While the
claimant in bankruptcy may seek a modification of the automatic stay, this
request is not always granted to mass tort claimants.3 3 In both a bankruptcy and
a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, the ultimate right to ajury trial may be written back
into the distribution process through negotiation among the parties. The
bankruptcy process allows removal of the tort claimant's case from its chosen
forum through the application of the court's "related to" jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 157, but in the settlement class action arena, the forum of choice is
maintained. From the mass tort claimant's perspective, the major differences between
settlement class action and bankruptcy are the delays and high transaction costs
inherent in the bankruptcy litigation process. The protection of the debtor and
its codefendants through the extension of the automatic stay, indefinite
extensions of the exclusive period, transfer of related cases to the bankruptcy
court, and the court's reluctance to lift the automatic stay all serve to remove
any pressure to negotiate a plan of reorganization. Without leverage to force
serious settlement discussions, mass tort claimants are at a disadvantage in the

action certification, id. at 620.
299. See supra note 54.
300. "[I]n most important respects, the use of a class action and a Chapter 11
reorganization plan may be functional equivalents because they both have the potential to
provide for the resolution of all, or most, claims ofa particular type." Vairo, supra note 8, at 8485.
301. Class representatives under Rule 23 correspond to creditors' and claimants'
committees under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code.
302. Class action settlement determination under Rule 23(e) corresponds to
confirmation of a plan of reorganization under §§ 1123 and 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
303. Houser, supra note 196, at 453.
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bankruptcy process.
Because the settlement class action begins with a settlement, it provides the
claimant and the defendant company with certainty as to the economic impact
of the resolution of claims on each party. In a traditional Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the parties have no certainty at the commencement of the case as
to how each will ultimately be treated. When the tort defendant files
bankruptcy, it is entering into a process in which it will have no guarantee that
future claims will be extinguished or that it may continue to operate its business
while it holds payment of claims in abeyance.
B. Treatment ofFuture Claims
One of the most vexing problems facing those seeking a global resolution
of mass tort claims is the treatment of unknown and future claims which
threaten to unravel attempts at permanent solutions. The Bankruptcy Code is
flawed as a mechanism for resolving future mass tort claims: the definition of
"claim" does not extend to future claimants. In essence, future claimants in
bankruptcy enjoy a de facto opt-out by definition leaving the reorganized
debtor open to successor liability. Methods such as channeling injunctions and
appointing futures representatives have evolved to remedy this situation. Yet,
debtors that gamble their companies on the belief that the reorganization
process will resolve all litigation against them find these newly developed
methods of resolving future claims in the bankruptcy context are being
challenged.3" If future claims are not effectively disposed of in Chapter 11,
successive bankruptcies are needed to resolve latent claims as they mature and
become "claims" within the meaning of § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.3" 5
In practice, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over future claimants is
eroding if it ever existed. Asbestos trust funds, such as those established in the
In re Johns-ManvilleCorp.3" 6 andIn reNational Gypsum Co.3"7 bankruptcies,
are increasingly found to be inadequate. Where claims are impaired, courts are
finding that future claimants' due process rights of notice and hearing are not
met. The Supreme Court's concerns about due process requirements as
expressed in Amchem are equally applicable future claimants in a Chapter 11
reorganization.3 8 Where there is no effective notice to creditors, there is no

304. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300,313 (1995) (holding that the
debtors cannot be permitted to collaterally attack the bankruptcy court's injunction); In reEagle
Picher, Indus., Inc., 164 B.R. 265, 272 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (rejecting the claimants'
proposal for an estimation hearing and establishment of a trust).
305. This being the case, mass tort bankruptcies involving future claims should not
be confirmed. Section 1129(a)(1 1) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits confirmation of a plan
which has a likelihood of being followed by a subsequent bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1994).
306. 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
307. 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
308. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621-22 (1997).
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discharge of claims through the bankruptcy process.
The focus of concern regarding treatment of future claims is the right to
due process: the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before property
is taken or a claim is impaired. The type of notice in a settlement class action
and Chapter 11 proceeding are strikingly similar or may be made so at the
discretion of the court. The purpose for giving notice is also very similar. The
intention is to bring all similarly situated claimants under the court's
jurisdiction. In a bankruptcy, it is in the interest of the debtor to give notice to
all claimants, including future claimants, so as to achieve finality." 9 There is
no doubt that the notice to identifiable claimants provided in a settlement class
action and in a bankruptcy adequately meet all due process requirements. The
pressing issue is whether the due process rights of future claimants are being
met.
In settlement class actions the definition of the class determines the extent
of the court's jurisdiction. In bankruptcy it is the definition of "claim" found in
the Bankruptcy Code that sets the goalposts. The developing consensus of the
decisional law is that the definition of claim in the Bankruptcy Code does not
encompass future claimants."' Therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction
over such claims amounting to opt-out by definition. If the Bankruptcy Code
was amended to bring future claims within the bankruptcy courts' ambit, could
a notice program be devised for futures that would satisfy due process
requirements? The Supreme Court's concern for the due process rights of
future claimants as to settlement class actions, which it expressed in dicta in
Amchem, is equally applicable to bankruptcy. At this time, it is uncertain
whether either settlement class action or bankruptcy has resolved the problem
of providing due process notice to future claimants. Both employ the same
forms of protection for future claimants: the appointment of a representative
for the interests of future claimants, the establishment of trusts from which
future claimants may seek recourse, and the remedy of injunctions channeling
future claimants to the trust and away from the debtor or defendant companies.
In the context of bankruptcy, these mechanisms are being challenged.31' In the
settlement class action context, the Supreme Court is questioning the
effectiveness of notice in cases that have employed all these protections for
future claimants." 2 The future of the resolution of mass tort future claims
remains to be written in decisional law.

309. Previous comparisons made between bankruptcy and class action solutions to
mass tort claims have failed to focus on settlement class action as opposed to litigation class
action. The combined notice requirements of Federal Rule 23(c) and (e)are stronger than the
requirements of Federal Rule 23(c) alone. A complete analysis of the heightened due process
requirements of class action settlement after Amchem is beyond the purview of this Article.
310. See, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994);
Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 924-25 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1995).
311. In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 400-01.
312. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
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C. Comparison of Representation in Settlement Class Action and
Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy, mass tort claimants may be represented by members of a
creditors' or claimants' committee who are appointed by the U.S. Trustee's
office."' There is no inquiry into the "representativeness" of members of
creditors' and claimants' committees unless there is an objection to committee
membership by a party in interest.3 14 In a settlement class action,
representatives of the class undergo extensive qualification and court scrutiny
prior to certification of the class. 35 The criteria for certification of class action,
including representativeness, is strictly enforced in a settlement class action.316
Tort claimants have greater assurance of fair representation in a settlement class
action.
D. Comparisonof the Approval Processes
Class action settlement occurs outside of court by representatives of the
claimants and is reviewed by a judge for fairness of the process and the
result.31 7 Individual members of the class do not "vote" on the settlement in the
sense that they would vote on a plan in a bankruptcy proceeding. However,
claimants may "vote with their feet" in a (b)(3) class by exercising their opt-out
rights and removing themselves from the class. The court, acting as a fiduciary
in both (b)(3) and (b)(1) class actions scrutinizes the agreement on behalf of
class members and determines whether the agreement is fair to the class.3 18 In
Chapter 11 reorganization the court presides over litigated matters in the
reorganization process, such as the estimation of claims, although it is absent
from the negotiation of the plan of reorganization. 319 The bankruptcy court
decides the issue of the fairness and feasibility of the plan of reorganization
when a plan is presented for confirmation. The court does not scrutinize the
process that leads to the formation of the plan. The bankruptcy plan is voted on

313. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1994).
314. Id. § 1102(b)(1).
315. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
316. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (limiting class
action suits by requiring strict adherence to the class action requirements of Rule 23); In re
Kroger Co. Shareholders Litig., 590 N.E.2d 391, 396 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (requiring the
certification criteria to be met by a preponderance of the evidence).
317. See supra Part II.
318. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
319. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 consciously removed the bankruptcyjudge
from the administration of the case (which the court had previously exercised). Under the
Bankruptcy Code it is common in complex cases to appoint examiners and professional
mediators to assist the reorganization process. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 744, 746
(E.D. Va. 1988) (using examiner Ralph Mabey, appointed pursuant to § 1104(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code and expert Professor Francis McGovern, appointed under Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
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by creditors who receive information about the plan in the form of a disclosure
statement.3"' The creditors' and claimants' committees may also make
recommendations to the creditors voting on the plan.32 If approved by those
creditors who vote, the court's inquiry into the "fairness" of the plan is limited
in scope. The bankruptcy court does not act as a fiduciary for claimants. If the
creditors do not agree on a plan, it may be forced on them or "crammed down"
over their objections. 3 In that case, the bankruptcy court must determine if the
plan is "fair and equitable." 3" A "fairness" test is not applied in a Chapter 11
plan confirmation unless a "cramdown" is attempted. The plan of
reorganization that is reached through negotiation in a bankruptcy does not
receive the scrutiny of the negotiations and the settlement that the class action
settlement receives.
E. Comparison of Settlement Class Action Valuation and Bankruptcy
Estimation
The estimation of claims in bankruptcy results in the de facto abrogation
of the tort claimant's right to a jury trial and may become a cap on
compensation to claimants. While a bankruptcy claimant retains the right to a
jury trial conducted by an Article III court, that right is a hollow one. The
bankruptcy court, as an Article I court, may not conduct a jury trial. Because
the bankruptcy court may not hear a tort action, the claim must be transferred
to an Article III court that may try tort actions. However, there is no
requirement that the bankruptcy court must allow a jury trial, and in fact,
bankruptcy courts routinely deny efforts to modify the automatic stay to
proceed in a pending case.324 In this way, jury trials are deferred without being
actually denied, and the bankruptcy court proceeds to value claims through an
estimation proceeding rather than liquidate them. In reality, the actual liability
is not determined on a case-by-case basis in the bankruptcy proceeding. The
estimation serves as the basis of the plan and becomes, in effect, a cap on the
distribution.325 Once confirmed, the plan operates to discharge the debtor of any
claim or portion of a claim disposed of in the plan. The tort claimant does not
have his day in court before a jury of his peers. The right to a jury trial is
involuntarily abrogated by the estimation proceeding.
This jury trial right is often written back into the process through a
provision in the distribution scheme that provides for jury trial after initial
offers and A.D.R. are nonavailing. In either a settlement class action or a
320. See Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 1125, 1126(a) (1994).
321. Id. § 1125(b).
322. Id. § 1129(b)(1).

323. Id.
324. Houser, supra note 196, at 452.
325. See David R. Weinstein & Robert C. Kim, Estimation of Claims: Precedential
Effects of Court'sEstimation, 15 AMER. BANKR. INST.J. 12, 12 n.1 (1996) (citing In re BaldwinUnited Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 758 (S.D. Ohio 1985)).
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bankruptcy trust, a delicate balance must be struck between paying so much
that the trust is depleted and paying so little that the trust must expend assets
on litigation which should be used to pay claims.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Bankruptcy Law
1. Section 524(g) Should Not Be Extended to Cover All Mass Tort
Bankruptcies at This Time
In analyzing the mass tort problem in bankruptcy, it is necessary to make
value judgments as to whom, if anyone, should be disadvantaged. Should the
creditors be disadvantaged by, for example, taking a percentage rather than full
payment so that the corporation may survive? Should present claimants be
disadvantaged in favor of future claimants or vice versa? One commentator
speaks of "the unfairness of persons in the present taking for themselves
'
resources that ought to be reserved for the future."326
It is a value judgment

whether resources "ought" to be reserved for future claimants. The reality of
the bankruptcy forum is that if the case is filed as a Chapter 7 or converted to
a Chapter 7, there is nothing provided for future claimants because the
company is liquidated and the proceeds of the sale of assets are distributed
among existing creditors. What may seem to be "misappropriation of resources
rightfully belonging to future persons 327 is the fundamental premise of a
bankruptcy liquidation.
The fact that Chapter 11 reorganization grew out of a liquidation paradigm
is evident in the tension that exists within the Bankruptcy Code straining to
deal with future claims in mass torts. The statutory existence of Chapter 11
dates to 1936,32 and its use by a solvent debtor dates to 1978. Our experience
with mass tort bankruptcies is a more recent phenomenon. Through its
evolution bankruptcy law has departed from its original purpose, which was the
liquidation of the debtor's assets to pay its creditors, and has become an effort
to reorganize a debtor. The liquidation-based "fixed pool" concept underlying
the reorganization 3process
is inapplicable to mass tort claims which continue
29
future.
the
into
far
The mass tort bankruptcy process is presently too heavily skewed in favor
of debtors and future claimants to be fair to present mass tort victims. Prorata
treatment of present claimants is unequal to the 100% treatment of future
claimants via "opt-out" by definition and successor liability. The lack of

326. Smith, supra note 153, at 153.

327. Id.
328. See text accompanying note 130.
329. Perhaps it is necessary to return to the concept which originally motivated the
creation of a Chapter 11: maximization of the estate for the benefit of creditors.
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uniform treatment of similarly situated claimants must be remedied. If a value
judgment is made that future claimants should be paid, and the method chosen
is bankruptcy, then § 524(g) in its present form should be extended to all mass
tort bankruptcies. Trusts should be established out of which all mass tort
claimants, present and future, are treated equally. All § 524(g) due process
protections presently in place, including the future representatives, the
channeling injunction (to the extent it directs claims to an adequate trust) and
claimants' trusts, should remain in place. There has been too little experience
with § 524(g) to determine its effectiveness. It is too early to extend § 524(g)
to cover all mass tort bankruptcy cases.
2. Payment of Claims to the Full Extent of the Debtor's Ability
Should Be Enforced
One of the objectives of mass tort litigation is the deterrence of future
injury and the acceptance of corporate responsibility on the part of the
tortfeasor. Some economic theorists believe that tortfeasors should pay the full
losses suffered by plaintiffs and society.33 This satisfies the purpose of tort law
which is to compensate victims and discourage behavior that causes injury. In
the traditional one-on-one tort litigation, the defendant has to compensate the
plaintiff for the full amount of the injury which has been incurred and may also
face punitive damages. A settlement offered in this context is usually
discounted only by the amount of the uncertainty of the final decision and the
costs of litigation. In the class action context, the same process is in operation
but on a larger scale. In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, there is an
assumption that the plaintiff will get only apro ratashare of the debtor's estate
and will not be made whole. This "cents on the dollar" assumption clashes with
the deterrent purpose of tort law. The claimant that then negotiates a plan of
reorganization with the debtor further discounts its claim, thereby experiencing
a double discount. Ironically, tort claimants that do not participate in the
bankruptcy, either because they are unknown or are future claimants at the time
of the bankruptcy, may make a collateral attack through a successor liability
suit on the reorganized entity and may receive up to 100% of their claim.33 '
Reorganized debtors should be required to pay into a claimants' trust until all
claims are paid in full to effectuate the deterrent policy underlying tort law and
promote corporate responsibility. The principal underlying the absolute priority
rule should be strictly enforced.

330. Deborah R. Hensler, ResolvingMass Toxic Torts: Myth andRealities, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REv. 89, 97 (1989) (citing ELIZABETH M. KING and JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC Loss &
COMPENSATION INAVIATION ACCIDENTs 7 (1988)).

331. See supra Part II.
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3.

Delay and Excess Expense Should Be Reduced

The transfer of non-debtor third-party claims and the extension of the
automatic stay coupled with extended exclusive periods create a disincentive
to settle. This inertia on the part of the debtor results in delay and excessive
bankruptcy transaction costs. To avoid this result, bankruptcy judges should
modify the automatic stay allowing pending litigation claims to proceed up to
the point of execution. In this way, pending claims would be liquidated. The
real opportunities for a jury trial should be provided in the plan of
reorganization for the remaining unliquidated claims.
Based on the empirical data collected by Professor LoPucki,332 bankruptcy
courts should strictly enforce the time periods provided for exclusivity in mass
tort cases. Amendment of the Bankruptcy Code to provide for shortened
periods of exclusivity and limits on the judge's discretion in granting further
exclusive time should be enacted.
B. Settlement Class Action
1. Amendment ofRule 23 to ProvideExpresslyfor Settlement Class
Action
The uncertainty surrounding the validity of settlement class action under
Rule 23 should be resolved by the Supreme Court decision in Amchem.
However, it would be prudent for Rule 23 to be amended to expressly authorize
settlement class action. The amendment should also provide for the
appointment of a future representative for unidentified and future claimants.
This would be a codification of current practice.
2. Subclassification to Insure Representativeness
A common reason for denial of certification of a settlement class is the lack
of commonality333 and failure of representativeness 334 among large classes of
disparate members. This shortcoming can be remedied and the due process
rights of mass tort victims protected by subclassifying the various types of
injury to be represented by separate counsel.
At the end of the day there are two elements which determine the fairness
of the legal process for tort victims: the speed and efficiency of the process and

332. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
333. See Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 516 F. Supp 1345, 1352 (E.D. Pa.
1981); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bowling, 429 N.E.2d 172, 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
334. See, e.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1294 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding no basis for this contention); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 416 (9th Cir.
1985); Golub v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distrib., Inc. (In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig.),
93 F.R.D. 485, 487 (D. Md. 1982).
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the amount of compensation delivered relative to the value of the claim. The
settlement class action is structured to deliver fair compensation to tort victims
in an efficient and timely manner. The judicial process begins with a settlement
arrived at through negotiations on a level playing field and approved after
extensive court scrutiny of the settlement and the settlement process. Third
parties that do not contribute to the settlement remain subject to suit.
The bankruptcy process, on the other hand, produces delay and increases
transaction costs. It offers no scrutiny of the settlement process and little actual
scrutiny of the choice of representatives of the claimant group. Both settlement
class action under Rule 23 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy can be improved by
faithfully applying available statutes and exercising discretionary powers to
protect the rights of mass tort claimants. The application of each proceeding to
the resolution of mass tort claims is a recent development which continues to
evolve in response to new challenges. The development process is not
complete. Both settlement class action and bankruptcy hold promise for the
resolution of mass tort claims. It is important at this point in the evolutionary
process that both settlement class action and Chapter 11 reorganization be
allowed to develop to their fullest potential as solutions to mass tort claims
resolution.
C. Conclusion
Settlement class action contains the elements that some perceive to be the
advantages of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. However, settlement class action comes
without the delay and excessive transaction costs endemic in bankruptcy. In
order for settlement class action to succeed as a viable solution to mass tort
claims, courts should fully exercise their discretionary powers to insure
complete due diligence of the settling company and determine the value of
claims of the class. Courts and class counsel must insure proper representation
by subclassification of similar claims. The mechanisms found in §524(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code are presently being replicated in settlement class action and
should continue to be used with increasing effectiveness. If courts and
plaintiffs' counsel fully utilize the discretionary power given to the courts under
Rule 23, settlement class action offers a more expedient, less expensive means
of resolving the large numbers of claims than does Chapter 11.
If the Bankruptcy Code is enforced as written, Chapter 11 could be a fair
and effective means of resolving mass tort claims. In order to reestablish the
balances between debtors and creditors which motivated the drafting of the
1978 Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts should refuse to extend the debtors
beyond a short period and should grant more liberal modification of the
automatic stay to allow liquidation ofpending claims. The absolute priority rule
should be absolutely enforced so that the full value of the debtor's estate is
applied to pay mass tort claims. Bankruptcy court jurisdiction over non-debtor
third parties should be applied sparingly and only where it can be shown that
it does not cause delay.
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Both settlement class action and Chapter 11 reorganization, if used
properly, hold promise for resolution of mass tort claims. Neither should be
discarded due to prevailing biases favoring one solution over the other. Each
should be allowed to evolve so that mass tort claimants have choices available
to them for the fair and equitable compensation of their injuries.
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